Towards the Sociogenic Principle:
Fanon, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience,
of “Identity” and What it’s Like to be “Black”

by Sylvia Wynter

Stanford University
Professor Emerita

Department of
Spanish & Portuguese and the Program in
African and African American Studies

"Reacting against the constitutionalist tendency of the late nineteenth century, Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis. He substituted for a phylogenetic theory the ontogenetic perspective. It will be seen that the black man's alienation is not an individual question. Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny ..." [Frantz Fanon] Black Skins, White Masks, 1967

"Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms,...(Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man)....But no matter how the form may vary , the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism... [F]undamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism--something it is like for the organism.

We may call this the subjective character of experience." [Thomas Nagel, "What it is like to be a bat", 1974, 1979]

"Against reductionism, I will argue that consciousness might be explained by a new kind of theory. The full details of such a theory are still out of reach, but careful reasoning and some educated inferences can reveal something of its general nature. For example, it will probably involve new fundamental laws, and the concept of information may playa central role. These faint glimmerings suggest that a theory of consciousness may have startling consequences for our view of the universe and of ourselves." [David Chalmers, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience 1995]

INTRODUCTION

This essay proposes that Frantz Fanon's dually third person, and first person exploration of the "lived experience of being black" in his book, Black Skins/White Masks, was both to develop the earlier insights of Black American thinkers such as W. E. B. Dubois with respect to the conflicted "double consciousness" of the "Negro" in Western civilization, [Dubois, 1986:364-65] and to put forward, as the explanatory cause of this "double consciousness" a new theoretical object of knowledge, which enabled the calling in question of our present culture's purely biological definition of what it is to be, and therefore of what it is like to be, human. While Fanon gave to this new object of knowledge the name sociogeny, [Fanon, BS:11], I have adapted the term, the sociogenetic principle 1 on the basis of this concept in order to both relate it to be and contrast it with, the genomic principle defining of the species-identity of purely organic life. On the basis of this, I shall further propose that Fanon's new conception of the human, one generated from the ground of his own, as well as, that of his fellow French Caribbean subjects' lived experience of being black, of what it is like to be black, [Epigraph 2], also opens a frontier onto the solution to the problem defined by David Chalmers as that of the "puzzle of conscious experience". The puzzle, both as to how a subjective experience could possibly arise from the neural processes in the brain" [Chalmers, 1995:80], as well as to why all this processing has to be accompanied by an experienced inner life". [Chalmers, 1996: vii] Why, in effect, the imperative of experience, the necessity of consciousness? Against the reductionism of the physicalistic thesis which proposes that mind or consciousness is, simply, what the brain does, Chalmers puts forward the hypothesis (cited in Epigraph 3), of the existence of as yet uncovered "fundamental laws" that are specific to the phenomenon of conscious experience. Because, he further argues, such laws, as ones that may "centrally involve the concept of information", would have to be based on the proposition that "conscious experience he considered a...feature.
feature-in-itself, can nevertheless depend "on underlying physical processes." [Chalmers, 1995: 83]

In this context, because the question specific to New World black thinkers from W. B. Dubois to Fanon himself, with respect to the issue of consciousness, has been, rather than the purely third person question of the why of conscious experience as posed by Chalmers, a socially situated and first person one based directly on the painful, conflicted, nature of their own consciousness, and, therefore, of their identity, as "Negroes" or "Blacks", the essay will propose the following: That Fanon's explanatory concept of sociogeny put forward as a third person response to his own first person questioning, serves, when linked to the insights of Thomas Nagel's 1974 essay "What it is like to be a bat" (Epigraph 2), to verify Chalmers' postulate with respect to the empirical functioning of psychophysical laws, as these laws function at the level of human experience. That, further, such laws are not only redefinable at this level as sociogenetic or nature-culture laws, but also as ones whose processes of functioning, while inseparable from the physical (i.e. neurobiological) processes which implement them, would at the same time, be non-reducible, as the indispensable condition of what it is like to be human to these processes alone; and, therefore, to the laws of nature by which those processes are governed. Further, if, as Nagel proposes, an organism can have "conscious mental states" only if "there is something it is like to be that organism", something, it is like for that organism, for therefore, its identity as such an organism, then Fanon's exploration of the "lived experience of the black" , and thereby, of the processes of functioning of these psychophysical laws within the terms of our present hegemonic modes of identity, (as itself, but one variant of the hybrid nature/culture modes of being unique to us as humans), can at the same time, also provide insights into the functioning of these laws as they function at the level of purely organic forms of life. That is, insights into the laws which govern the realm of lived subjective experience, human and non-human: which govern, therefore, the interrelated phenomena of identity, mind and/ or consciousness.

The Lived Experience of the Black, The "Fugitive Truth" of the "Local Culture" the West, The Degodding of Human Identities, The Invention of "Man"

Frantz Fanon's exploration of the "lived experience of the black" was carried out in his book Black Skin, White Masks. Originally published in France with the title Peau Noire, Masques Blancs, in 1952, it was translated into English by C. Lam Markmann and published in the U. S. in 1967. Although the title of his fifth chapter, the chapter which carries the burden of his exploration, and which is given in the original French as L 'Experience Vécue Du Noir, has been translated into English as The Fact of Blackness, several Fanon scholars have recently given its more accurate translation as that of The Lived Experience of the Black. This is an important correction. The first English translation implies that what Fanon deals with in this chapter is with Blackness as an objective fact. The second makes clear that what Fanon deals with in this chapter, is with the "subjective character" of the experience of the black, of, therefore, what it is like to be black, within the terms of the mode of being human specific to our contemporary culture, which although now globally hegemonic, was identified by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in 1983 as one that is no less "local" and specific than are all other human cultures. The problem however, is that this culture, as Geertz further pointed out, continues to see itself as not being a culture at all, doing so by repressing "the fugitive truth" that it is "but one of the forms that life has locally taken" [Geertz,1983: 16]. Nevertheless, I propose, the repression of this truth has been all the easier, here, given that, although a "local culture", Western culture was to become one unique in human history, by reason of its epochal degodding or secularization of our human modes of identity, from the sixteenth century onwards, pari passu with its global imperial expansion. This degodding, which began with the invention of "Man" in the sixteenth century, (as a political being in the reoccupied religious place of
therefore been effected by Western intellectuals, was the detaching of human modes of being from their millennial and transculturally universal anchoring in the religious "space of otherness" [Godzich,1987:161]⁴ of the realm of the supernatural; and their reanchoring, in the wake of the intellectual revolution of Darwinism, in the now secular, but to no less extrahuman "space of otherness" realm of bioevolutionary Natural Selection.⁵ This epochal secularization of the subjective experience of what it is like to be human, had however, been carried out within the terms of the semantic field of the matrix Judaeo- Christian Narrative that remains foundational, if in new terms, to the contemporary culture of the West. [Luc de Heusch. 1985:159]⁶

Further it is in the context of the repression of the "fugitive truth" with respect to the local culturality of our present, purely biologized conception of human identity, that now underlies all our present disciplinary discourses, (as disciplinary discourses which function, within the terms of their overall "two cultures" organization of knowledge, the natural sciences on the one hand, and the social sciences and Humanities on the other, to elaborate and institute "Man" [Foucault, 1973:386-87]), that determines that the "puzzle of conscious experience" [Chalmers, 1995: 80], has hitherto, had to remain unresolvable. Since it is only within the terms of our present culture's purely ontogenetic and/ or biocentric conception of the human identity, and thereby, from the particular viewpoint of this ethno-class (i.e. Western bourgeois) conception, that the phenomenon of our human modes of consciousness, and, therefore, of subjective experience, including that of our subjectively experienced modes of identity, must necessarily remain outside the reach of a transculturally applicable, and thereby, scientific, description.

Let me first set out the nature of this puzzle as it has been defined by both Chalmers (1991,1995,1996) and, earlier, in his by now classic 1974 essay, "What it is like to be a bat", by Thomas Nagel.

**Part One**

**How do Physical Processes in the brain give rise To "How Things Feel for the Subject", to Subjective Experience? Why do We Have Experience at all?**

In his essay, "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience" published in The Scientific American of 1995 (as a prelude to his 1996 book The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory), David Chalmers points out that while "conscious experience is the most familiar this in the world", it is also the most mysterious. While, from an objective viewpoint, the brain and its neurobiological processes are "relatively comprehensible", the issue of how we come to experience these processes subjectively, still remains to be explained. Such an explanation would call for answers to be given to three questions: Why does it (consciousness) exist? What does it do? How could the subjective inner life of the mind possibly arise from neural processes of the brain? Although the answers to these questions had been shunned by researchers on the premise that "science which depends on objectivity could not accommodate something as subjective as consciousness", during the past several years, a great number of "neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers" had confronted the issue, and resolved a few of its aspects. However, their answers that had been ones that cleared up the "easy problems"--that is, problems that because they have to do with "the objective mechanisms of cognitive systems", as mechanisms that while amenable to the third person accounts of the natural sciences, have nothing to do with the first person account of the subjective experience itself. Consequently, "the really hard problem" remains to be solved. This problem can itself be defined by several related questions: how do the physical processes of the brain give rise to the "inner aspect of thought and perception"? To "the way things feel for a subject"? In effect, to subjective experience, and in such a way that when "we see, for example, we experience visual sensations such as that of vivid blue." In
spectrum". But knowing this, a third person feature, is not the same as knowing what it is like to experience the color blue or red. It therefore follows that "there are facts about conscious experience that cannot be deduced from physical facts about the functioning of the brain." [Chalmers, 1995: 82] In any case, why should these physical processes need to be accompanied by conscious experience at all, (i.e. by how things feel for, and are experienced by, the subject)? Why, for example, should identity have to be experienced in order to exist?

While, Chalmers continues, the neurosciences may indeed come to be able to explain the "neural correlate of consciousness" , even eventually to give to a detailed correspondence between specific processes in the brain and related components of experience" , because they are unable to explain why and how these processes give rise to conscious experience (indeed, to the specific contents of these experiences), they are still unable to cross "the explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness". Proposing that it is this explanatory gap that will "demand a new kind of theory" , Chalmers defines such a theory as one that would have to be based on the hypothesis of the existence of as yet unrecognized "fundamental laws of consciousness" , which he identifies as psychophysical laws. In support of this, he argues, that in the same way as in physics, "space-time, mass and charge (among other things) are regarded as fundamental features of the world" so it can be proposed that conscious experience itself may be considered a fundamental feature, "irreducible to anything more basic". While given that where "there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws", such laws with respect to the property of conscious experience (of how things feel to a subject), would necessarily be ones that "relate experience to elements of physical theory" .As a result, not only would such laws be able to "serve as a bridge specifying how experience depends on underlying physical processes" , they would also enable the projection of a now complete "theory of everything" based on two components. The first, that of physical laws, which tell us "about the behavior of physical systems from the infinitesimal to the cosmological" ; the second, that of "what we might call psychophysical laws" that are able to tell us how "some of these (physical) systems are associated with conscious experiences". [Chalmers, 1995:83]

After defining the "basic contour of such a law" as one that can be " gleaned from the observation that when we are conscious of something, we are generally able to act on it and speak about it--which are objective physical functions", as well as conversely that "when some information is directly available for action and speech, it is generally conscious", Chalmers speculated that "the primary psychophysical laws may centrally involve the concept of information". While relating his concept of information to the abstract notion of information, put forward by Claude E. Shannon in the 1940s, which had defined information as "a set of separate states with a basic structure of similarities and differences between them" that "can be embodied in the physical world", as happens when they correspond to physical states (voltages), Chalmers suggests that parallely, "we can also find information embodied in conscious experience." Should this be so, the hypothesis would ensue that perhaps "information, or at least some information, has two basic aspects: a physical one and an experiential one". While if we see this as having the "status of a fundamental principle that might underlie the relation between physical processes and experience" , then wherever we find conscious experience, it could be seen to exist as one aspect of an "information state, the other aspect of which is embedded in a physical process in the brain." [Chalmers,1995:85]

Continuing this vein in his 1996 book, The Conscious Mind Chalmers explores varieties of human conscious experience. In his introduction, after giving a "far-from-complete catalog of the aspects of conscious experience", he makes several points that are key, apposite, to the thesis of this paper. After listing some of these aspects, such as "visual experiences", auditory experiences, tactile experiences, olfactory experiences (which remains a "primitive presence in our sensory manifold" one defined as "the mute state, one without words" as in "the stench of rotting garbage" or "the warm aroma of freshly baked bread"), etc.
of conscious experience". With respect to the first, he points out that, although hard to pin down, one somehow knows that "there is something to the phenomenology of self simply because we feel that "there is something to conscious experience that transcends all these specific elements of experiencing i.e., tactile, visual, or whatever; in effect "a kind of background hum... that is somehow fundamental to consciousness and that is there even when the other components are not." [Chalmers, 1996:10] The second he defines as "the unity of conscious experience--the way that all of these experiences seem to be tied together as the experience of a single experience". And while, like the sense of self this unity can seem illusory, since "it is certainly harder to pin down than any specific experience" we nevertheless have "a strong intuition that unity is there", [Chalmers,1996:11]. My proposal here is that we see both of these latter aspects, of conscious experience as the expression of the governing phenomenon at the level of human forms of life that I have defined, after Fanon, as that of the sociogenic principle; that is, as the analogue, at the level of human identity, of the genomic principle, at the level of purely organic forms of life. Further, that it is also this sense of self as a sense of being-in-the-world that Thomas Nagel identified in his 1974 essay, as the indispensable prerequisite of "conscious experience", that is, a non-reducible and basic feature in its own right, one, with whose contemporary form, culturally elaborated as the identity or sense of the self of "Man", (i.e. the human in its Western-bourgeois or ethno-class conception), black thinkers from Dubois to Johnson, to Fanon have found themselves in painful, even anguished, conflict. As the extreme form of a conflict grappled with not only by post-independence Latin-America and the Caribbean, by Jews emancipated from the ghetto in Western Europe, but by the thinkers of the non-Western countries, that were colonized in the second wave of nineteenth century of imperialism both of Western Europe and of a "North America" then caught in the grip of the belief system of "Manifest Destiny" .

What it is like to be For that Subject, For that Organism: Identity, The Sense of Self, its Point of View and Nagel's Challenge of an "Objective Phenomenology"

Nagel had also argued that while "reductionist euphoria" had produced "several analyses of mental phenomena" , what had been ignored was precisely the issue of consciousness, and therefore the issue what "makes the mind-body problem unique" . As a result, we still have "no conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon could be". However, should a "new theoretical" form be devised for that, its basic feature would have to be the fact that conscious experience is inseparably linked to what it is like to be a specific organism, to the way in which the organism subjectively experiences its mode of being in the world. That, further, an organism, whatever its form may be, " can have conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism---something it is like for the organism." Above all, the unique nature of this feature, one that can be defined as the subjective character of experience I is that because it is one that resists explanations, in purely physicalistic terms, it constitutes the most difficult stumbling block for any account which puts forward the thesis of a physical basis for the mind. Given that while "that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, " and it would seem inevitable "that an objective, physical theory" would have to abandon such a particularistic point of view, the problem for the natural sciences here, is not only that all subjectivity is inescapably connected with a point of view, but that it is precisely the existence of such points of view that makes evident lithe importance of subjective features."

Here Nagel gives an illustration of his by now classic case of the bat, as that of a form of life that is, physiologically speaking, "fundamentally alien to our own".

"I have said", Nagel, writes, "that the essence of the belief that bats have
by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine." [Nagel, 1979: 167]

Nagel then argues that although given that our own experience, as one related to our own physiological structure which "provides the basic material for our imagination" necessarily makes it impossible for us to "extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case", and therefore may only permit us to "ascribe general types of experience on the basis of the animal's structure and behavior," (such as, for example, to describe "bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward perception"), nevertheless, we could still be able to conjecture "that such an experience must also have a specific subjective character," even though beyond our ability to conceive. It is this recognition of the fact that it is possible for us to believe in the "existence of facts... whose exact nature we cannot possibly conceive", that would then enable us to recognize that, while we do not as yet possess the vocabulary to describe it adequately, the subjective nature of our experience as humans is no less highly specific than is that of the bat's. Seeing that if "intelligent bats or Martians" were to find themselves in the parallel situation of trying "to form a conception of what it was like to be us", [p.170] while the structure of their own minds "might make it impossible for them to succeed", we ourselves would know, since we know what it is like to be us, that it would be "wrong to conclude that there is not anything precise that it is like to be us: that only certain general types of mental states could be ascribed to us". While the bearing that this recognition (i.e., that facts can exist that we are unable to comprehend), has on the mind-body problem is that it "enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience." This observation is that whatever "may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view." (p.171) This concept, however, "does not refer to "the alleged privacy of experience of its possessor", since it "is not one accessible only to a single individual". Rather, "it is a type"; and it is because the point of view "refers to a type that there is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective", seeing that "one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is". And although even here, however, these facts are subjective "in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt this point of view--to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak", nevertheless, it is the "typed" nature of the subjective experience, and thereby of identity or the "sense of self" that presents us with the possibility of what Nagel postulates as an "objective phenomenology".

Can There Be An Objective Phenomenology, As There is An Objective Physiology? Can Experience have an Objective Character at All? Facts For a Specific Viewpoint? For a specific “sense of self”? A specific mode of identity?

To define what such an objective phenomenology would have to be, Nagel first makes a distinction between a special type of facts--i.e. facts of experience--i.e. facts for a specific organism, for, in my own terms, a specific mode of human identity, (facts that might be defined as adaptive) and objective (or veridical)9 facts. Arguing that this distinction "bears directly on the mind-body problem", he points out that because "the facts of experience" as "facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism" are accessible "only from that specific point of view", it remains a mystery "how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the
humans, the purely bio-ontogenetic aspects of its being), is "a domain of objective facts par excellence--the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems," so that, for example, there would be "no comparable imaginative obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat neurophysiology by human scientists" I this cognitive advantage is reversed when it comes to the phenomenology of the bat, or indeed, of the human. An illustration of this is that when it comes to the functioning of our human brains, there is no reason to believe "that this functioning might not come to be known by Martian scientists or intelligent bats even more thoroughly and in depth than by ourselves." However, while for example, "a Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena," that scientist could never, as things stand now, be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world." (p.173) The fundamental difference here, is that, in the first case, the Martian scientist would have no problem in apprehending the "object nature of the things picked out by these concepts", given that 'I although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not", (p.173) In this case, the things themselves, because external to the two points of view that observe them, that of Martians and that of Earthlings, can be comprehended from other points of view. This is not so in the second case however. Here these same things exist as facts of experience for a particular point of view, facts that would cease to be such facts, therefore, without that specific "point of view". The corollary that therefore follows is that since, so far as hitherto known, "experience does not have, in addition to its subject character, an objective character that can be apprehended from many different points of view , then there is no way in which it can be supposed that a Martian investigating my brain might be observing physical processes which were my mental processes (as he might observe physical processes which were bolts of lightning), only from a different point of view." (pp.173-174)

When, therefore, one attempts to reduce consciousness, and in the case of humans, the sense of self or identity which makes this specific consciousness possible, to being an object definable only in the terms of the natural sciences, one has to confront the dilemma that the viewpoint-determined nature of consciousness or of subjective experience presents to their methodology .In that such a methodology in one in which the process of reduction calls for a "move in the direction of greater objectivity , toward a more accurate view of the real nature of things." (p.174) So that, to accomplish this goal, the individual natural-scientist must first of all, prescriptively attempt to reduce his/her dependence on his/her individual or species-specific points of view with respect to the object of investigation, so as to be able to describe the latter "not in terms of the impression it makes on (the) senses", but rather "in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. " And while the criterion here is that the "less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description" , we are able to follow this criterion only because" although the concepts and ideas we employ in thinking about the external world are initially applied from a point of view that involves our perceptual apparatus, they are used by us to refer to things beyond themselves" , in effect beyond the limits of our perceptual apparatuses which determine the phenomenal point of view we normally have of this external world. However, while in the terms of this natural-scientific approach, we can abandon our phenomenal viewpoint for an objective one and still be thinking about the same thing when we turn to the issue of subjective experience, because, in this case, the connection with a particular point of view is unbreakable, it "is difficult to understand what could be meant by the objective character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends it. " How then could we seek to "get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us?" This, given the fact that "if the
Here in giving an example intended to illustrate that "the seeds of this objection to the reducibility of experience are already detectable in successful cases of reduction", Nagel provides an analogy, that will link his later proposal of an objective phenomenology, to the new cognitive frontier that, I propose, has been opened up by Fanon's redefinition of the human being and identity, in hybridly ontogenetic and sociogenetic terms, and thereby, by the concept of sociogenesis/the sociogenic principle as new objects of knowledge only redefinable in the terms of such a redefinition. When, for example, Nagel writes "we discover sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in air or other media", although we leave "behind one viewpoint to take up another", the "auditory, human or animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unreduced." In consequence, this enables members of radically different species to "understand the same physical events in objective terms", yet without their being required to "understand the phenomenal forms in which those events appear to the sense of members of the other species."

"[Nagel, 1979:175] With the only proviso here being that for two different species to attempt to refer to a common reality", it is imperative that "their more particular viewpoints" should not be "part of the common reality that they both apprehend", given that "reduction can succeed" only if each of the species-specific viewpoint "is omitted from what is to be reduced."

Nevertheless, even this example, while it enables us to see that when it is a matter of "seeking a fuller understanding of the external world," we can set aside our specific points of view with respect to the way in which "sound is experienced by two different species, also compels us, Nagel continues, to recognize that when, in contrast, we deal with the "internal world", we can no longer ignore each specific viewpoint, "given that it is the essence of the internal world and not merely a point of view on it." It is this recognition that then compels us to confront the basic question as to "whether any sense can be made of experiences having an objective character at all"; as to whether, in effect, "objective processes can have a subjective nature." To tackle this basic question, Nagel then proposes, we now need to "pursue a more objective understanding of the mental in its own right", that is, as a pursuit that "without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject, challenges itself to form new concepts and devise a new method", that of "an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination." (p. 178)

Then arguing that it may very well be "only by means of a phenomenology that is, in this sense, objective" that questions about the physical basis of experience may be permitted to "assume a more intelligible form", the question that Nagel here leaves us with, is: What kind of methodology, analogous to that of the natural sciences, yet different from it, would such an "objective phenomenology" call for? And although, because Nagel, as like Chalmers, a mainstream scholar, necessarily takes his point of departure from a pre-Fanonian, and thereby purely ontogenetic perspective (with the identity of the human "us" being seen as a supracultural one defined only by its species-specific physiological structure, as the bat is defined by its own); the question that he poses with respect to the possibility of, and a methodology for, an "objective phenomenology" is the question that in the case of the human, Fanon confronts in his Black Skin/White Masks, at the same time as he opens up the possibility of its eventual resolution.

Part Two

"Truly What is to be done is To Set Man Free": Towards the Sociogenic Principle

"The white man is sealed in his whiteness. The black man in his blackness... There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to black men. Black men want to prove to white men at all costs, the richness of their thoughts, the equal value of their intellect. How do we extricate ourselves? I believe that the fact of the
"The third-person approach regards consciousness as a scientific problem, while the first-person approach treats it as a metaphysical issue. Under the third-person approach, consciousness is considered as a problem in science, like heat, life, or nuclear physics, and subject to the same methods... IT]here are three hard problems concerning consciousness, and that they lie within the first-person approach. The first is the problem of sensory qualia ...: Why does red look like red? Why does red look like anything at all? The second is the problem of mental content: thoughts are about something, say white elephants. By our physicalist assumption, thought arises from neural firings. But what should neural firings have to do with white elephants? The third is the existence of subjective experience: Why should subjective states exist in the first place?" [Stan Franklin, Artificial Minds, 1995: 30-31]

Omni: Descartes held mind and external reality together with God. You're holding the two with meaning.

Bohm: I say meaning is being! So any transformation of society must result in a profound change of meaning. Any change of meaning for the individual would change the whole because all individuals are so similar that it can be communicated. . .

Omni: All that seems to imply a radical change in the concept of being human.

Bohm: Yes. The notion of permanent identity would go by the wayside.

[David Bohm, Interview with Omni, 1982:72]

In this section, I shall propose that Fanon's hypothesis that, in the case of humans, "besides phylogeny and ontogeny there stands sociogeny" [BS., 11] as a hypothesis derived from his own dually first person/ third person description of the "lived experience" of the black, and thereby, from his attempt to carry out what Nagel defines as an objective phenomenology), displaces the hitherto "intractable mind/body opposition". It does this by its revelation that it is only from the point of view of the human identified in purely ontogenetic terms, that the "mind-body" problem can exist. I shall later argue that, what Fanon's exploration has made possible is the insight that in the case of humans, the laws of functioning of the always culturally relative modes of sociogeny, as the laws of functioning of what Ernesto Grassi first identified as the human code of the Word, and thereby of our modes of identity [Grassi, 1980:108-110], are themselves the expression, at the uniquely hybrid level of human forms of life, of what Chalmers postulated as the fundamental psycho-physical laws of consciousness and conscious experience. While by redefining Fanon's concept of sociogeny, as that of Grassi's code, and thereby of its sociogenic principle, I shall also propose that insights into the processes by means of which this principle is instituted, and, thereby, of the "phenomenal properties" to which each such principle, its mode of identity and point of view gives rise, should be also able to provide insights into the analogical processes of functioning, at the level of purely organic life, of the genomic principle as it determines the "sense of self" and "unity of experience" through the mediation of whose objectively structured point of view, the bat, for example, experiences what it is like to be a bat.

As the epigraph to his Introduction to Black Skin/White Masks Fanon makes use of a citation taken from a book written by his fellow Martilican, the Negritude poet, Aimé Césaire, which was entitled Discourse on Colonialism With this, Fanon indicates that his exploration of the lived experience of the Black is not only linked to the "lived experiences" of all the colonized non-white "natives", but that it will also be explored as an experience that has a specific historical origin. This origin is that of the rise to hegemony (in the reoccupied place of the earlier hegemony of
and its invention of "Man"; with both of these events then leading, from the fifteenth century onwards, to the state-sponsored global imperial expansion of Western Europe. This expansion, which began with the landing of a Portuguese expedition on the shores of Senegal, West Africa, in the 1440's, followed by the transatlantic landing of Columbus, (as an emissary of the Spanish state), on an island of the Caribbean in 1492, laid the basis of our contemporary single world system as well as of the single history that we now live. Like the lived experiences of all the peoples of the Americas and the Caribbean, the lived experience of the Black as explored by Fanon was to be an experience made possible therefore, only within the globalizing field of the new phenomenon of the Western world system, a field whose origins lay in specific historical events and processes of cultural transformation, that had taken place in Europe; processes of transformation, whose epochal secularization of what it is like to be/not be human, in effect of human identity, was, however, to be gradually imposed on the rest of the peoples of the world.

"I am talking", Fanon cites Césaire, "of millions of men who have been skillfully injected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, abasement." [BS:7] This means that the range of emotional behaviors, experienced by the peoples colonized by the West, rather than being natural, had been "skillfully injected" through processes of cultural socialization as the indispensable condition of the bringing into being of the contemporary order of modernity.11 These subjective feelings of abjection are therefore ones linked to a non-white "native" and, in its extreme form "negro" or "nigger" "sense of self", defined by its enforced position, as the no less invented, Human Other to Man [Pandian/1985:3-9],12 on the negative or liminally deviant side of a line, identified by Dubois, as that of the Color line. 13 And it is on the issue of the Color line as a "fact of experience" specific to Man in its now purely secular, and biocentric conception, specific, therefore to our contemporary mode of being human, to its identity and point of view, on which Fanon focuses his introduction: "Supply a single answer", he writes, "and the color problem would be stripped of all its importance: What does a man want? What does a black man want?" The difference has to be noted, for the black man, he points out bluntly, "is not a man", seeing that as "the result of a series of aberrations of affect" he finds himself "rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be extricated." The goal of his book is to effect the black man's extrication from his very sense of self, from his "identity".

"The problem is important. I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself. We shall go very slowly, for there are two camps: the white and the black...

We shall have no mercy for the former governors, the former missionaries. To us, the man who adores the Negro is as 'sick' as the man who abominates him.

Conversely, the black man who wants to turn his race white is as miserable as he who preaches hatred for the whites.

In the absolute, the black is no more to be loved than the Czech, and truly what is to be done is to set man free." [BS:8-9]

The quest to effect the "liberation of the man of color from himself" will be therefore inseparable from the quest to "set man free". And to do both, he will find himself compelled to confront the paradox of human consciousness. In that consciousness, rather than being the answer, is itself, a contested site, one that reflects a projected antimonic universe. To confront this antimonic universe his book will have to penetrate to a "level where the categories of sense and nonsense are not yet invoked". He will need to think the black/white antimony, to lay bare its functioning, without evasion.

"The black man wants to be white. The white man slaves to reach a human level... The white man is sealed in his whiteness. The black man in his blackness."
To escape this "vicious circle" which has sealed the one in its whiteness, the other in its blackness," only a psychoanalytical interpretation of the black problem", as the problem of the human being most entrapped in it, "can lay bare the anomalies of affect that are responsible for the structure of the complex". For him, there is nothing "natural" nor indeed "normal" in the structure of the Black/White complex. And although the only way out of this psycho-existential complex, one defined by the aberrations of affect or qualitative mental states which such a complex induces, is for each individual, black and white, to endeavor to take on "the universality inherent in the human condition", it is precisely this antinomic psycho-existential complex that prohibits, at the same time, such an alternative possibility. It is necessary to recognize, nevertheless, that, although he will be approaching the problem of this morbid complex from a psychological perspective, "the effective disalienation of the black man" will also imperatively entail "an immediate recognition of social and economic realities". For the inferiority complex that the Black experiences is "the outcome of a double process", one that although "primarily, economic", also calls for "the internalization--or better the epidermalization--of this inferiority." And what must here be grasped, is that the second part of the process is no less objectively structured, even where subjectively experienced, than is the first. Here Fanon effects his first rupture with the central tenets of mainstream psychology, in order to argue for the objectively, because socially, structured nature of the blacks' feelings of inferiority, even of autophobia, and, by implication, the no less objectively and socially structured nature of the anti-black racism and feelings of superiority on the part of whites. Freud, Fanon argues, in reacting against the late nineteenth century focus on phylogeny, had insisted that "the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis". He had therefore substituted an ontogenetic perspective for the earlier phylogenetic one. The problem here however, with respect to the black man's alienation, was that it is not an individual question, and cannot, therefore, be explained in the purely ontogenetic terms of the psychoanalytic paradigm. Rather, the black man's alienation calls for another explanatory model, one based on the hypothesis that besides "phylogeny and ontogeny there stands sociogeny"--i.e., the always socialized nature of our modes of being human, and thereby of our experiencing what it is like to be human. While given that psychoanalysis' projected "cure" is dependent on the premise that the individual subject is a purely ontogenetic mode of being which preexists the processes of socialization in whose terms it comes to experience itself as human, the "cure" called for in the case of the black would be one based on a sociodiagnostics. [BS:11] This is so, given the fact that neither the internalized inferiority complex of the Black nor the internalized superiority complex of the White, can be dealt with outside the frame of the pathology, that is as instituting of the social order, as it is of the mode of sociogeny and therefore of identity that is reciprocally, its condition of existence. This situation, therefore, calls for a prognosis different to that of psychoanalysis whose goal is to adjust the individual to society. Instead, since "society", the social order, cannot, "unlike biochemical processes escape human influences", seeing that it is the human itself that "brings society into being" (with the social order, therefore never pre-existing our collective behaviors and creative activities), the prognosis is that of overall social transformation. As such the "cure" is "in the hands of those who are willing to get rid of the worm-eaten roots of the structure." [BS: 11]

It is this relating of the socialized nature of the individual subject to the production and reproduction of the social order itself, that will lead Fanon, in a later chapter, to further challenge the ostensibly autonomous notion of the family, that is, the familial concept central to the Freudian concept of the Oedipal complex. As Ronald Judy notes, while Fanon had elaborated the concept of identification, "according to his reading of Lacan's mirror stage", as one in which the ego only takes on its specificity, after the Oedipal passage, he was to be nevertheless emphatic in asserting that "the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being among Negroes". Judy, 1996:67-68] Instead, pointing out "that in the French..."
closed environment" it could be said "that every neurosis, every abnormal manifestation, every affective erethism in the Antillean (or Caribbean) subject is the product of his cultural situation." In effect, of a situation in which there is a constellation of postulates, a series of propositions that slowly and subtly, with the help of books, newspapers, schools and their texts, advertisements, films, radio, penetrate an individual--constituting the world-view of the group to which one belongs. In the Antilles (the Caribbean) that world-view is white because no black voice exists. " [BS: 152] So that if, as Bohm points out (Epigraph 3) meaning is being, the neuroses of the Caribbean colonized (or now, neo-colonized) subject, cannot be understood outside the terms of the officially constructed system of meaning; one in which no black voice, can be allowed to exist in its own terms, as the indispensable condition of the order's reproduction.14

What Fanon proposes here, therefore, is the possibility, of a phenomenology in whose context, specific neuroses can be seen to have been lawfully induced; with an analysis of the processes of their constitution, thereby coming to make possible a phenomenology of the self, which is not only the phenomenology of a "type", but also one in which the projected "transcendental" subjectivity of Husserlian phenomenology can be transformed into that of a mode of subjectivity specific, not only to a historical time and place, but also to a specific cultural constellation: to its system of meaning.

"It is normal", Fanon writes in a later chapter, "for the Antillean (Negro) to be anti-Negro. Through the collective unconscious he has taken over all the archetypes belonging to the European. The anima of Antillean Negro is almost/always a white woman. In the same way, the animus of the Antillean woman is always a white man. That is because in the works of Anatole, France, Balzac, Bazin, or any of the rest of "out' novelists, there is never a word about an ethereal yet ever present black woman or about a dark Apollo with sparkling eyes." [BS: 191]

By the very terms of his book's title, Black Skins/White Masks, with its redefinition of the human, as that of human skins, cultural masks, Fanon has therefore effected a shift from the "family situation" as the origin of the individual, to the overall social order, (of whose reproduction the family itself can now be seen as being but a proximate function), which he now posits as the source of the modality of the individual subject. In Europe, he points out, in this context, "the 'family is' everywhere 'a miniature of the nation', with the consequence that, as 'the child emerges from the shadow of his parents he finds himself once more among the same laws, the same principles, the same values... (he finds himself 'a normal man')" [BS: 141-2]. While, as ethnologists have pointed out, this is no less so in the case of the still auto-centric Pygmy of Africa who are also produced as the normal subjects of their cultural constellation, it is therefore within the terms of a postulated overall" cultural constellation" and of the overall social order to whose production and reproduction it gives rise, that, for Fanon, the etiology of the black man's alienation, is to be found. The black will therefore be able to "cure" himself/herself only if he/she is prepared to wage war at both levels--at that of the socioeconomic, and that of the sociogenic. Seeing that, because each level has historically influenced the other, in such a way that "any unilateral liberation is incomplete", a solution will have to be supplied both at the objective level of the socioeconomic, as well as at the level of subjective experience, of consciousness, and therefore, of "identity". Here if, as Nagel pointed out, the paradox of attempting to elaborate an objective phenomenology, is that the methodology used by the natural sciences, is directly opposed to the one needed to deal, not, as in the natural sciences, with the reality behind appearances, but rather with reality as it exists for, as it therefore appears to, the subject, Fanon also declares his own rupture with a natural scientific methodology. Although, it is considered "good form to introduce a work in psychology with a statement of its methodological point of view", he declares, he will be derelict in this respect; He "will leave method to the botanists and the mathematicians". His point of departure will be one that instead can enable him to uncover, "the various attitudes that the Negro adopts in contact with white civilization." The aberrant emotional responses that he therefore intends to explore, are not ones that have the jungle savage in mind (i.e., the
not experienced the "cultural imposition" of the West. Since for that still culturally
tauto-centric mode of being which had preexisted the advent of the secular
European, "certain factors", (such as, for example, the Color line) , would not have
acquired importance; [BS:12] given that they would have been as unthinkable as
they would have been subjectively unexperinciable.

For it had been only in the wake of the expansion of the West into Africa
and the New World, from the fifteenth century onwards, followed by the mass slave
trade in whose terms, and in the context of the increasingly dominant Western
cultural system of meaning, Africans had become trade goods, labeled as
negros/negras (i.e., Negroes), at the same time as Europeans had come to believe
themselves to be, and therefore to identify themselves as being naturally free, as
the latter were ostensibly, natural slaves, that the "fact of the juxtaposition of the
two races" , had come to create a "massive psychoexistential complex" . This is the
complex that he has set out to "analyse in order to destroy" . The chapters of his
book are each intended to contribute to this project. While in the first three
chapters he will deal "with the modern Negro"--i.e., "I take the black man of
today" and "try to establish his attitudes in the white world" , it is the fifth chapter
however, one in which he will attempt to give a "psychopathological and
philosophical explanation of the state of being a Negro" that will most carry the
burden of his book's thesis. As Fanon describes this chapter . "The fifth chapter
which I have called the lived experience of the black important for more than one
reason. It portrays the Negro face to face with his race. It will be observed that
there is no common link between the Negro of this chapter and the Negro who
wants to go to bed with a white woman. In the latter there is clearly a wish to be
white. A lust for revenge, in any case. Here, in contrast, we observe the desperate
struggles of a Negro who is driven to discover the meaning of black identity. White
civilization and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro.
I shall demonstrate elsewhere that what is often called the black soul is a white
man's artifact." [BS:13-14]

"Stop Acting Like a Nigger!" On the Qualitative Aspects of the Mental
States of The Caribbean Negro Before He Goes to France

"But I too am guilty, here I am talking of Apollo! There is no help for it. I am a
white man. For unconsciously I distrust what is black in me, that is the whole of my
being... When I am at home my mother sings me French love songs in which there
is never a word about Negroes. When I disobey, when I make too much noise, I
am told to 'stop acting like a nigger'."

[Fanon, BS, 191]

"We'll see that the third-person approach seems not sufficient to explain all first-
person phenomenon. Let's start with qualia. Qualia are the qualitative aspects of
our mental states, such as color sensations, the taste of chocolate, pleasure and
pain. Looking at a red patch triggers a pattern of nerve firings. Why is there such a
rich subjective sensation? Why this sensation and not green? And how personal
that sensation is."

[Stan Franklin, Artificial Minds, 1995:32]

"Consciousness is unfolded in each individual. Clearly, it's shared between people
as they look at one object and verify that its the same. So any high level of
consciousness is a social process... The word, which is outside, evokes the
meaning, which is inside each person... Meaning is the bridge between
consciousness and matter. Any given array of matter has for any particular mind a
significance. The other side of this is the relationship in which meaning is
immediately effective in matter. Suppose you see a shadow on a dark night. If it
means 'assailant', your adrenaline flows, your heart beats faster, blood pressure
rises, and muscles tense. The body and all your thoughts are affected, everything
about you has changed. If you see that it's only a shadow, there's an abrupt
change again."

In his first chapter the *Negro and Language*, Fanon analyses the situation of the French Caribbean Black or Negro before he goes to France, before he encounters "white eyes" as the only "real eyes". In the Caribbean, the pervasive cultural imposition of France and Europe, together with their systemic denigration of all things of African origin, led to a situation that when he and his peers, as children, behaved badly, either made too much noise, disobeyed, or spoke Creole (the Afro-French vernacular common to the Francophone Caribbean), they were sharply admonished by their mothers to "stop acting like a Nigger!" [BS:191]

However, while still in the Caribbean they had an option. Although Negroes, they could opt not to *behave like one*, thereby not falling entirely into non-being, the negation of being human. A useful parallel arises here, one that enables to make use of the idea of the trans cultural space or perspective on human identity that was put forward recently by Mikhail Epstein. Epstein had argued that, because "culture... is what a human being creates and what creates a human being at the same time, the human being should be seen as being (simultaneously) creator and creation." While "in the supernatural we have the world of the creator, and in nature we have the world of creations", it is however of "the coincidence of these two roles in a human being that makes him a cultural being." The problem here, nevertheless, is that while culture freed us from nature it was able to do so only on the condition of subordinating us to its own categories, since it is through all such culture specific categories that we can alone realize ourselves, as in Fanonian terms, always already socialized beings. Epstein's proposal here is therefore, that it is only *transculture*, the transcultural space opened between different cultures, that can in turn free us from our subordination to the categories of the single culture through the mediation of which we come to realize experience ourselves as human beings.

The transcultural parallel here is that the injunction "stop acting like a nigger" functioned for Fanon and his middle class French Caribbean peers, in the same way as for the Vodunists of Haiti, and in the terms of their originally African-derived and now Afro-Catholic syncretic religion, the imperative of refraining from what were proscribed as anti-social behaviors was sanctioned by the fear on the part of its subjects, of being transformed into a zombie as punishment by the secret society of Bizango whose members were and are entrusted with the role of punishing such behaviors. For if "normal" being, or identity, was/ is for the Vodunist, to be anchored in one's *ti bon ange* (i.e., "that component of the Vodun soul that creates character, will-power, personality") to be made into a zombie was/ is made to become, by means of the administration of a powerful toxin tetrodotoxin which induces a physical state enabling the victim to be misdiagnosed as dead (Davis, 1988: 9], cataleptic, as a state believed to be caused by the loss of one's *ti bon ange*, of one's soul. While, because for the Vodunist, once robbed of one's soul, the body is but an empty vessel, subject to the commands of an alien force, who would now maintain "control of the *ti bon ange*" (Davis, 1988: 9], the threat of experiencing zombification is the threat of a death more real than physical death itself.

If in the case of the symbolic belief system structuring of the Vodunists' sense of self, it "it is the notion of external forces taking control of the individual that is so terrifying to the Vodunist", what Fanon enables us to see by analysis, is not only the way in which the culturally imposed symbolic belief system of the French bourgeois *sense of self*, also structures the *sense of self* of the colonized French Caribbean middle class Negro. But also, that it is a *sense of self for which*, it is the notion of "acting like a nigger", and thereby of lapsing into non-being that, (like the threat of zombification for the Vodunist), serves as the internalized sanction system which motivates his/her behaviors, thereby functioning in the same way as a "garrison controls a conquered system." In this context, a transcultural perspective on two quite different injunctions related to two quite different *senses of the self*, yet functioning to the same end, enables us to recognize that the qualitative mental states which correlate with the aversive sensations, or fear of behaving, in the one case, in such an anti-social way as to make the threat of zombification real, and, in the other as to make the threat of "negrification" real, are of the same objectively instituted and subjectively experienced modality, even where the cultural conceptions of identity, of what it is...
However, as Fanon’s exploration enables us to see, as long as the Caribbean Negro remains in Martinique or Guadaloupe, he does not experience himself as a nigger. Rather his sense of self, one which impels him to void “acting like a nigger”, is, as Fanon shows, produced as normal and thereby “white self”; in effect, as the French bourgeois mode of the self, in whose terms he has been socialized through the mediation of the formal as well as familial educational processes. His “black skin” therefore literally wears a “white mask”, but it is a contradiction that, while still in the Caribbean, he is not compelled to confront. It is therefore only after his arrival in France, that the shouted cry “Dirty Nigger” will compel him to experience himself as being concretely, that Nigger Other which had functioned only as a threat in the social sanction system of his Caribbean colonial society. Nevertheless, in order to fully understand the major features of the “lived experience” of the Caribbean Negro even before going to France, we need to recognize the crucial role of the language, of the imposed system of meaning, in whose terms the Negro is induced to see himself as the direct result of his” colonialist subjugation.” Central to this language there had been a specific conception of what it is to be human, and therefore of his prescribed role in this concept.

“No one”, Fanon writes, “would dream of doubting that its major artery (i.e. of the Negro’s self - division) is fed from the heart of “those various theories that have tried to prove that the Negro is a stage in the slow evolution of monkey into man” , [BS: 17]

What Fanon alerts us to here is that the ascribed role of the Negro in these theories is an indispensable function of our present culture’s purely ontogenetic conception of the human, one that represents the species as existing in a purely continuist relation with thereby organic life, defining it on the model of a natural organism [Foucault, 1973:310].

In consequence, given the far-reaching nature of this conception of human identity, it is not enough to have merely understood the causes of the Negro’s self-division. The imperative is instead to end it. To do this, one must recognize that "to speak" does not mean only "to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language." It means, above all, “to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization.” [BS: 17-18] The situation which the Negro confronts in the Caribbean, therefore is that within the logic of the specific civilization in which he finds himself, within the language which it speaks and which speaks it, one, as a “Negro”, will find oneself being “proportionately whiter” and thereby proportionately “closer to being a real human being”, “direct ratio” to one’s mastery of the French language; or as in the U. S. A. and the Anglophone Caribbean, in direct ratio to his/her mastery of the English language in its standard middle class (or "good English") form. 18 In consequence, the Negro of the Caribbean, because he also speaks an Afro-French (or Afro-English) Creole vernacular language, "has always to face the problem of language:" this, as part of a vaster matrix which determines his/her lived experiences both as "Negro" and as "colonized" native. This is so in that "every colonized people" that is, “every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality”, must now find itself "face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. In this situation, the colonized Negro is not only elevated “above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards”, in addition, he "becomes whiter" to the extent that he "renounces his blackness, his jungle." [BS: 18] While, given that the logic of these new cultural standards has “totemized" being fully human (i.e. the ostensibly farthest from the primates and thereby most highly evolved), in the European physiognomy and culture-complex, it is to the extent that the Caribbean Negro "renounces his blackness, his jungle" that he experiences himself as more human. As a result, formally educated to be both a member of the French bourgeois elite and white, for the Caribbean Negro, the dream of going to France had logically been the Holy Grail. Indeed anyone of this group who had gone to France and, through rigorous practice, come to speak the "French of France", finds that this is one of the sings “that marks him when he returns, as
the one-who-has-gone-to France, thereby undergoes a definitive restructuring--
i.e., he experiences himself in quite different terms:

"The black man who has lived in France for a length of time returns radically
changed. To express it in genetic terms, his phenotype undergoes a definitive, an
absolute mutation. Even before he had gone away, one could tell from the almost
aerial manner of his carriage that new forces had been set in motion." [BS:19

Fanon further explains, here in a note, that by this, he means that "Negroes who
return to their original environments convey the impression that they have
completed a cycle, that they have added something to themselves, literally
returning full of themselves. " At the same time he also goes on to propose in the
body of the text, that this transformation of the subjectively experienced identity of
the Caribbean Negro, is one that arises directly from a specific socio-cultural
situation, which serves to activate a specific biochemical and therefore physicalistic
correlate; in Bohm's terms, transformed meanings have led to transformed matter,
to a transformed mode of experiencing the self. What Fanon makes clear here is
that it is for the French Caribbean Negro, imprisoned on a poverty stricken colonial
island, and lost "in an atmosphere that offers not the slightest outlet" , that the
appeal of Europe is like "pure aire which he breathes in". It is for him that the
world will only seem to "open up" once he leaves his island and arrives in France.
Hence, at the news that he is indeed getting to France, getting, thereby 11 a start
in life" , he is jubilant. He makes up his mind to change. Yet we see, however,
Fanon writes, that with the change of his cultural situation from a closed and
blocked situation to one of relatively more open possibilities, his "structure" before
any reflective process on his part, "changes independently" . To support this thesis
Fanon cites an example given by two U. S. scholars who had found, through a
series of research studies that they had undertaken, that, in married couples, at
some stage in their marriage, "a biochemical alteration takes place in the
partners." It would therefore be "equally" interesting to "investigate the body fluids
that occur in Negroes when they arrive in France." Or, simply "to study through
tests the psychic changes that take place." [BS:22]

What Fanon is revealing here, in the terms of the issues posed by Chalmers
and Nagel, is that there are subjectively experienced processes taking place, whose
functioning cannot be explained in the terms of only the natural sciences, of only
physical laws. Seeing, as the case of the Caribbean Negro is going to France
demonstrates, the transformation of subjective experience, is, in the case of
human, culturally and thereby, socio-situationally determined, with these
determinations in turn, serving to activate their physicalistic correlates. In
consequence, if the mind is what the brain does, what the brain does, is itself
culturally determined through the mediation of the socialized sense of self, as well
of the "social" situation in which this self is placed. Fanon is here again, therefore,
centrally challenging the purely biocentric premise of our present culture's
conception of the human, as this conception is elaborated not only by psychology,
but by all the disciplines that comprise the human sciences. For as he argues here,
these disciplines "have their own drama" , and it is a drama based on a central
question. Should the inquirer postulate, as in the standard approach, a "type for
human reality and describe its psychic modalities only through deviations from it?"
Or should the imperative of the inquirer be rather that of striving "unremittingly for
a concrete and ever new understanding of man". [ BS:22]

In the terms of the answer given by the standard approach of the human
sciences, one is able to read, for example, "that after the age of twenty-nine, a
man can no longer love and that he must wait until he is forty-nine before his
capacity for affect revives". Reading this, "one feels the ground give way beneath
one". It is therefore imperative, if one is to recover one's balance, to recognize that
there is a central purpose to this standard approach, to understand that" all these
discoveries, all these inquiries lead only in one direction" , have "only one goal" ;
that the specific aim of this goal is to "make man admit that he is nothing,
absolutely nothing--and that he must put an end to the narcissism on which he
being 20 "amounts to nothing more nor less than man's surrender." Refusing to accept "man's surrender", Fanon therefore puts forward a counter-manifesto, with respect to human identity. Having reflected on the possibility put forward by the standard approach, he declares, "I grasp my narcissism with both hands and I turn my back on the degradation of those who would make man a mere mechanism. Further, even if "there can be no discussion on a philosophical level"—that is, the plane of the basic needs of human reality--I am willing to work on the psychoanalytical level--in other words, the level of the 'failures,' in the sense in which one speaks of engine failures." [BS:23]

For it is at this level, that certain discoveries can be made. Such as the fact that when a specific (biochemical) change occurs in the Caribbean Negro who arrives in France, the change occurs only "because to him, the country represents the Tabernacle." Nor is this representation an arbitrary or contingent one. Not only has everything in his earlier schooling and everyday life in Martinique, culturally indoctrinated him, in the terms that enabled him to experience such a representation as gospel truth, (pun intended), but it had also led to "the amputated sense of self", for which the experience of full being could only be enabled through the mediation of France and its cultural artifacts. The change in the phenomenal properties of the Caribbean Negro's sense of self (together with its biochemical correlates), can therefore occur only because of a specific process of socialization that had been effected and verified at every level of his existence in his French colonial island--his socialization, as a subject therefore, who is at one and the same time both French, and colonial "native", and/or Negro; as in effect both Man and Man's Other.

It is therefore only to this French colonial "native" subject, to his "sense of self" together with the particular point of view to which it gives rise, that power and full being can necessarily emanate only from the colonizer centre, France. Culturally amputated in his psyche by the everyday structures of Martinique, the "man who is leaving next week for France creates round himself a magic circle in which the words Paris, Marseilles, Sorbonne, Pigalle become the keys to the vault." As he leaves for the pier to set sail, "the amputation of his being diminishes as the silhouette of his ship grows clearer". At the same time, in "the eyes of those who have come to see him off he can read the evidence of his own mutation, his power. 'Good-by bandanna, good-by straw hat.' " He has been chosen; become one of the few selected ones allowed to escape the stereotype of exotic non-being imposed upon those who, non-chosen, must remain at home. The implication here is that the biochemical events taking place in his being as he reads the "evidence of his own mutation, his power" in the others' eyes, (and thereby the evidence of his own recognition in the terms of the dominant culture and its bearers), is determined by the change in his cultural situation, the shift from an amputated experience of being, to the experience of almost "full" (i.e. almost white), almost French, bourgeois, being. Meaning, in Bohm's sense, positively marked, has here affected matter-positively.

Then he arrives in France. The cry "Dirty Nigger" startles him into the shocked awareness that in the eyes of those who now surround him--white eyes as, as Fanon notes the "only real eyes"--he no longer has the option to behave or not to behave like a nigger! In those eyes, he is a nigger. And the cry fixes him in that subhuman status of as a "chemical solution fixes a dye":[BS:109] The glances of those eyes, the cry, has activated the phenomenal properties of the new qualitative mental states that Fanon explores in his fifth chapter as "the lived experience of the black." Meaning, negatively marked, has lawlikely affected matter (i.e., physiology), negatively.

"Dirty Nigger!? "Look a Nigger" "Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up!": My Body Was Given Back to Me As An Object. ...sprawled and distorted

"My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning on that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it's cold, the nigger is shivering...
your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up." [Fanon, BS: 113-114]

"[A]lthough the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not. " [Nagel, "What it is like to be a bat", 1974]

Fanon begins chapter 5 "The lived experience of the black" with an account of his subjectively experienced response to the hurled epithet i.e. "Dirty nigger" or simply "Look, a Negro"! At this moment, his idea of himself as one who had come into the world infused "with the will to find a meaning in things", one whose spirit had been "fiend with the desire to attain to the source of the world" is shattered. With that hurled epithet, that exclamation, "I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects." [BS: 10]  All attempts to escape that "crushing objecthood", eventually, fail. The "glances of the other fixed me there, in the sense in which a chemical solution is fixed by a dye." [BS:109]

"I was indignant; I demanded an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart. Now the fragments have been put together again by another self."

This "put together" other self then analyzes his experience, seeing it as one common to all black men. The quality of this experience, he recognizes, was new in kind. They had not known it when they had been among themselves, still at home in the French island colony of Martinique. Then, "he would have had no occasion, ...to experience his being through others." Here he must directly confront a reality that had not revealed itself in all its starkness, before his arrival--the reality of the "being of the black man."

"For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on themselves to remind us that this proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself on him." [BS:110]

Fanon has here defined the central prescription of what he had earlier identified as the mode of sociogeny, in whose terms, both black and white are socialized. While the black man must experience himself as the defect of the white man-as must the black woman vis a vis the white woman, neither the white man or woman can experience himself/herself in relation to the black man/black woman, in any way but as that fullness and genericity of being human, yet a genericity that must be verified by the clear evidence of the latters' lack of this fullness, of this genericity. The qualitative aspects of the two group's mental states with respect to their respective experiences of their "sense of self" are not only opposed, but dialectically so; each quality of subjective experience, the one positive, the other negative, depends upon the other. Because in Martinique however, among his own group, the recognition of this dialectic had been muted, the black man arrives in France unprepared for that moment "when his inferiority comes into being through the other".

"And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man's eyes. An unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a third-person consciousness." [BS:110]
through the "glances of the white Others". In the first case, the spatio-temporal, if he wants to smoke, he knows that certain movements will be called for. In order to get the cigarettes which are at the other end of the table, he will have to extend his right arm across the end of the table, to get to the matches which "are in the drawer to the left" he will have to "lean back slightly." The movements that he will make "are made not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge." This implicit knowledge is that of certain pre-given schema--one as specific to what it is like physically to be human, (i.e. the human in its purely phylogenetic/ontogenetic dimension), as is the unique pre-given schema, specific to the bat. One can therefore speak here of a world governed by biologically determined assumptions--assumptions verified by the objective facts of what it is like to be a member of the human species. This is not the way, however, that he will experience this self, this body, in the specific culture-historical world in which he must necessarily realize himself as human, through his interaction with "normal" others, who are here, necessarily white. In this interaction, he is no longer in control of the process of the effecting of "a composition of the self" based on implicit knowledge of the biological schema that is his body. Here, another mode of conscious experience takes over. This mode is one that compels him to know his body through the terms of an always already imposed "historico-racial schema"; a schema that predefines his body as an impurity to be cured, a lack, a defect, to be amended into the "true" being of whiteness.

"For several years", he writes, "certain laboratories have been trying to produce a serum for 'denegrification'; with all the earnestness in the world, laboratories have sterilized their test tubes, checked their scales, and embarked on researches that might make it possible for the miserable Negro to whiten himself and thus to throw off the burden of that corporeal malediction. Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema." [BS:111]

The central questions posed by Stan Franklin (in the context of his summary of Chalmers' 1991 discussion of the hard problems "of consciousness"), arise here. Why, Franklin had asked, with respect to sensory qualia, does red look like red, or like any thing at all? Further, why with respect to mental content, if things are about something, say white elephants, and if "by our physicalistic assumptions thoughts arise from neural firings", why should "neural firings have to do with white elephants"? [Franklin, 1995:31] In our own case with "Dirty Nigger!"? Why, in addition, should the neural firings which underlie the glances of the "White Others" that Fanon is made to experience, have to do with the "corporeal malediction" placed upon the black body, in the terms of a specific "historico-racial schema" in which both the bearers of this body and the white glancers at this body, find themselves entrapped? Why further should the specific mental states and its specific phenomenal properties, of the glancers, (i.e. of those who are in the process of living the experience of being "white"), as well as the mental state and its phenomenal properties of those who are glanced at, and who must experience the negative effects of these glances, as part of living the experience of being black, have to be those specific states at all?

Fanon gives an answer. Unlike the image of his body as it functioned in a purely spatio-temporal world devoid of White Others, this other self that he is being called upon to experience, is one that has been constructed for him "by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories." In consequence, the "mental contents" of his new qualitative view of his body, and the "neural firings" with which they correlate, are non-arbitrarily linked through the mediation of those" anecdotes", those "stories" out of which he had been woven; stories which elaborate the very historico-racial schema and "corporeal malediction", whose negative meanings imposed upon his being. For there is an imperative dialectic at work here. In that it is precisely by means of the same anecdotes and stories, (if in binarily opposed terms, of "corporeal benediction"--rather than of "malediction"), that the sense of self, of the white subject from whose point of view the color and
normal sense of self which in turn "weaves" the negro, as its negation, its other, out of a "thousand anecdotes." Anecdotes / stories, that are therefore, as constituting of the normal subject as "White", as they are of its abnormal Other, as "Black".

Hence the logic by which, Fanon, confronted by eyes which see him through the mediation of these woven networks, finds that where he had thought that he merely had to "construct a physiological self, to balance space, to localize sensations," he was now called upon to do more. That is, to construct himself, in the terms of those pre- determined elements, in order to "verify" the "truth" of the others' glances, the "truth" therefore, of their order of consciousness, and to do so in order to confirm both the purely biological identity of being human in its bourgeois conception, as well as its normative definition in "white" terms. In effect, to make himself into a fact of negation, which alone enables the experience of being "white". And for this to be done, within the plotlines of the narratives which alone makes it possible, he must experience the corporeal reality of his body, as one that has always already been transformed by the negative stereotypes placed upon it, into a subhuman reality. In several encounters he experiences the effects of this substitution. Traveling on a train, for example, he feels himself "assaulted at various points", his "corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema." As he seats himself he finds that now, "it was no longer a question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person." He is given not one but two, three places.

"I existed triply: I occupied space. I moved toward the other...and the evanescent other, hostile but not opaque, transparent, not there, disappeared. Nausea. . ." [BS:112]

His body had been reified into a type which triggers the reflexly aversive behaviors, that are inseparable from the aversive sensations of qualitative mental states felt collectively by all those who avoid him; as mental states lawfully activated by the pervasive sequence of negative associations, which predefines him, making him "responsible at the same time for his body, his race, his ancestors who are all necessarily cannibals." So total is this that he is compelled to see himself as he is seen by those "white" eyes, which are the only "real" , because the only "normal eyes".

"I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: 'Sho' good eatin' ." [BS:112]

He now begins to experience himself, therefore, through the mediation of stereotyped concepts specific to a particular point of view and visual phenomenology, in other words not as he is, but as he must be for a particular viewpoint. Yet what had been the origin of that particular viewpoint, that visual phenomenology? The culture- specific source of the "anecdotes, the stories", by which both had been and still continue to be constructed? Here, if as Michel Foucault pointed out in his The Order of Things, "Man" as a new (and ostensibly universal because supracultural), conception of the human, had in fact, been invented by a specific culture, that of Western Europe, during the sixteenth century, [Foucault, 1973:386] the anthropologist Jacob Pandian notes that this invention had been made possible only on the basis of a parallel invention. [Pandian, 1985:3-9] This had been so, he explains, because while Western Europe was to effect the transformation of its medieval religious identity, that of the True Christian Self, into the now secularizing identity of Man, it was confronted with the task of the inventing of a new form of binarily opposed Otherness to Man, one that could reoccupy, in secular terms, the place that its conception of the Untrue Christian Self had taken in the matrix religio-cultural conception of the human, Christian. In consequence, where the Other to the True Christian Self, of medieval
Renaissance in the context of the intellectual revolution of civic humanism, the other in the context of that of Liberal or economic humanism which took place at the end of the eighteenth and during the nineteenth century), Europe was to invent the Other to "Man" in two parallel forms. And, because "Man" was now posited as a supracultural universal, its Other had logically to be defined as the Human Other.

In the first form, it was to be the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean and the Americas, who, classified as "Indians", were to be discursively constructed as the physical referent of the "savage" and thereby Irrational Human Other to the new "sense of the self" of "Man", defined as, homo politicus and as the Rational Self. At the same time, the enslaved transported African peoples, classified as Negroes, were to also be assimilated to this Irrational Other category, as its extreme form. That is, as a mode of the human so irrational, that it constituted the missing link between (the still divinely created) rational human species and the (equally, still divinely created) animal species: and as such had to be governed and mastered for its own good. However, with the reinvention of "Man" in new terms, in the wake of the Darwinian Revolution, (which replaced the cosmogony or Origin Narrative of Genesis, and its model of Divine Creation or Design with that of the hybridly scientific and cosmogonic Narrative of Evolution together with its model of Natural Selection), a shift was to occur. It was now to be the category of the Negroes, defined as comprising all peoples of African hereditary descent, whether unmixed or mixed, together with their origin continent of Africa, that were to be discursively constructed as the physical referent of the conception of Man's Human Other. It was therefore to be in the terms of this specific historico-cultural schema and constellation, that a "corporeal malediction" was to be placed upon all peoples of African hereditary descent, as the ostensibly non-evolved dysselected and therefore "racially inferior" Other [Pandian, 1988: ] to the true human, Man, and made to reoccupy the now purely secularized form of the matrix Untrue Christian Self (Pandian, 1985:3-9)

As with DuBois earlier, therefore, Fanon, socialized through his bourgeois education, to be "Man" and therefore, to be "normal" , must experience himself in doubly conscious terms, as being both norm and Other. Had he been "white" he would have experienced no disjunction: indeed he would have been unable even to conceive of what its like to be not "Man", to be "a black man" and as such the negative other to the human, as such the bearer of a "corporeal malediction." It is only therefore out of his own lived experience of being both "Man" (in its middle class definition) and its liminally deviant Other (in its race definition), that Fanon will be enabled to carry out his dually first and third person exploration of what it is like to be at one and the same time, both "Man" in the terms of our present ethno-class conception of the human, and the embodiment of its anti-Negro, anti-human criterion. "Look, a nigger!" My body, Fanon writes, "was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recoled, clad in mourning in that white winter day". He experiences a disjunction between himself and his body; he at one and the same time sees it, as the normative "white" consciousness sees it, and finds himself shattered by the terms in which he is seen by that consciousness. He begins here a series of associations which his own doubly conscious perspective will enable him to predict in its pre-determined and inevitable progression. It is at this moment that although he is the target of the sensations activated by this series of associations, he is also enabled to see himself as he must, objectively be for a "particular point of view and visual phenomenology"; even more for a point of view and phenomenology that is now globally hegemonic-as is its “sense of self” in whose terms, he too has been socialized into normative subjectivity. He becomes aware of his skin of his body, his physiognomy, as if it were indeed a uniform, a livery—"I had not seen it. It is indeed ugly. I stop there, for who can tell me what beauty is." Since from that "particular point of view", within the terms of the qualitative aspects of the mental states specific to the, sense of self, or mode of sociogeny of our present ethno-class conception of what it is like to be human, how can the black skin color and Negroid physiognomy not be experienced as aesthetically ugly? Indeed, how can the state of being a Negro not be that of experiencing oneself as being of a different genus to the True human, within the
"[A]lready", Fanon writes, "I am being disected under white eyes, the only real eyes, I am fixed... [T]hey objectively cut away slices of my reality I am laid bare. I feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has come in, but a new kind of man, a new genus. Why it's a Negro."

[Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, 1967: 116]

**Part Three**

**On The Way of Subjective Experience, The Artificial and Relative Nature of being Human, Identity and The Fundamental Laws of Consciousness**

"Why should subjective states exist in the first place?"

"Continuing to take stock of reality, endeavoring to ascertain the instant of symbolic crystallization, I very naturally found myself on the threshold of Jungian psychology. European civilization is characterized by the presence, at the heart of what Jung calls the collective unconscious, of an archetype: an expression of the bad instincts, of the darkness inherent in every ego, of the uncivilized savage, the Negro who slumbers in every white man." [BS: 187]

"The indigenous peoples of the Congo are all black in color, some more so, some less so. Many are to be seen who are the color of chestnut and some tend to be more olive-colored. *But the one who is of the deepest black* in color is held by them to be the most beautiful... There are some children who although their parents are black, are born white-skinned... And these are regarded by the Congolese as monsters... Given the fact that a black skin is so highly regarded among them, we Europeans appear ugly in their eyes... As a result, children in those areas, where a white has never been seen before, would become terrified, fleeing in horror from us, no less than our children here are terrified by the sight of a black also fleeing in horror from them." [Teruel, Antonio de, *Narrative Description of . . . the Kingdom of the Congo* (1663-1664) Ms. 3533:3574 National Library, Madrid, Spain]

"Since this world of nations has been made by men, let us see in what institutions all men agree, and have always agreed. For these institutions will be able to give us the universal and eternal principles, such as every science must have, on which all nations were founded and must preserve themselves." [Giambattista Vico, 1744/1970:53]

"We do not need to explain away the subjective experience. *We are what we experience ourselves to be.* Our self-experience of intentions and 'will' are not epiphenomenal illusions." [Terence W. Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain*, 1995: 458]

Why indeed should subjective states exist? Why *Should experience* be, as Chalmers proposes, a fundamental feature, in its own right? The proposal here is that Fanon's thesis that besides phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny, reveals that the cultural construction of specific "qualitative mental states" (such as the aversive reaction of white Europeans and of blacks ourselves to our skin color and physiognomy) are states specific to the modes of subjective experience defining of what it is like to be human, within the terms of our present culture's conception of what it is to be human, and, thereby, in the terms of its sociogenic principle, as the bat's subjective experience of what it is like to be a bat, are states defining of what it is to *be* the lived expression of a species-specific genomic principle. How had this come to be? In his book *Rhetoric and Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition*, Ernesto Grassi points out that our human mode of being was to come into...
genetically ordered governing “directive signs”, that are motivating of the behaviors of purely organic forms of life; by, therefore, the replacement of the hegemony of these signs, by that of the new directive signs of a governing human code inscribed in the Word, or Sacred logos of religious discourse. This discourse, by ritually prescribing what had to be said, and what had to be done, were now to no less compulsorily necessitate the behaviors of its subjects, than the genetically programmed “directive signs” compel and necessitate the species-specific behaviors of purely organic forms of life. [Grassi, 1980:106] Arguing further that the new directive signs of the Logos could only have emerged in the life of the planet at a time, when for a single species the genetic “directive signs” had come to be experienced as “insufficient”, Grassi proposed that it was this initial situation of insufficiency that had led to the rise of the Word and thereby to that of a new governing human code, through whose verbal mediation “life was now to receive a completely different meaning compared to that of biological life” [Grassi,1980:110]

Two scholars, one a sociologist Donald Campbell, the other a linguist, Philip Lieberman, have defined this insufficiency in parallel terms. Campbell proposed, that although as humans, we live in societies that are even more complex and more large-scale, than those of the social insects, we, unlike the latter, are not integrated on the basis of the high degrees of genetic similarity which makes the social cohesion of the insects possible. For while the social insects are able to display altruistic behaviors towards the members of their group, with some categories, the sterile castes giving up their own possibilities of reproduction, So as to carry out tasks that enable the overall reproduction of, in the case of bees, the hive, given that their high degrees of genetic similarity ensures that their own genetic information will be transmitted by their siblings, this is not so in the case of humans. These, like all members of the mammalian primate family had followed a different evolutionary pathway, that led to high degrees of genetic individuation, and, therefore, of reproductive competitiveness. Because at the same time, the runaway evolution of the human brain, correlated with its option for bipedalism, and with the upright stance, which made it necessary for their infants to be born early, the protracted stage of helplessness of their young now called for a mode of cooperative rearing and therefore for a mode of eusociality, which went beyond the limits of the modes of genetically determined kinship characteristic of the primate family. [Campbell;1972:21-23,1988:31-32] The genetically programmed modes of an eusociality characteristic of all other forms of organic life had proved insufficient for the human species.

In the same context the linguist Philip Lieberman was also to propose that the evolution of the human capacity for language was to provide the answer to the need for the kind of more inclusive selfless behaviors indispensable to human modes of eusociality .For while, at the genetic-instinctual level, humans are able to respond altruistically only to those within the narrow limits of the circle of their genetic kin, at the level of language, they can be induced, through the mediation of words and meanings, to display a more generalized and inclusive mode of altruism. [Lieberman, 1991:166-172] Induced, that is, to display to those made artificially similar to them, through the institutional processes of socialization, by means of which, as now cloned subjects, all participating in the same order of symbolically coded consciousness instituted about each culture’s governing sociogenic principle and its code of "fake" similarity , they could now subjectively experience themselves as culturally co-defined conspecifics, or symbolic kin. While, as Campbell also argued, it is with respect to the indispensable nature of the conditioning processes needed to override the narrow limits of genetic kinship and to artificially induce the modes of more inclusive altruism needed for the cohesion of human orders, that we need to understand the pervasive presence of the schemas of “sin and temptation in the folk morality of our religious traditions” [Campbell,1975:22]. Since schemas that whether in their religious or in their now secular forms, can be recognized as the “artificial” behavior motivating “narratives” whose “vernacular languages of belief and desire” [Miller, 1992:182] structure our culture-specific orders of consciousness, modes of mind, and thereby of being.
self to be created, as one able to override, where necessary, the genetic-instinctual sense of self, at the same time as it itself comes to be subjectively experienced as if it were instinctual; and is thereby enabled not only to reoccupy the formerly hegemonic place, of the genetic self, but also to harness its drives to its now culturally defined sociogenetic own.23

If we see, therefore, that the experience of what it is like to be human, is only made possible by means of the, at first sacred, religio-cultural, and now in our contemporary case, objective secular-cultural discourses and their coercive semantic technologies by means of which the genetic-instinctual self of the individual is transformed, through processes of social conditioning, into that of each order's culturally prescribed "sense of the self" or sociogenic principle, then it is this principle, and the institutions by means of which it is imprinted that provides the constant able to provide a transculturally applicable "common reality": the constant that Vico, in the context of his call for a New Science specific to human societies, predicted as the institutional complex that would be found to be common to all societies. [Vico, 1970:53] While because, in this context, it can now be also proposed that the phenomenon of "mind", as the mode of consciousness unique to the human, is the emergent property of these programmed and thereby "artificial" or socialized senses of self, a corollary logically follows. This is that the laws or rules which govern the nature-culture processes inscripting of our modes of sociogenetic being, and thereby of "mind", can be identified as the human form of the psychophysical laws whose existence has been postulated by Chalmers. That in consequence, the identification of such laws as they function at the hybrid level of our modes of being human, should not only be able to solve the puzzle of conscious experience, at the level of human forms of life, doing so by revealing its role as the indispensable concomitant of our culturally relative modes of being or senses of self, but should also be able to provide an answer to the related question as to the why of subjective experience, in general. The why, also, of the centrality of the experience of identity to our experience of what it is to be human.

The thesis put forward by the neuroscientist Gerald Edelman is illuminating. Edelman points out that each organism as it confronts its environment, must necessarily know and classify the world in terms that are of adaptive advantage to the organism, terms that can orient the behaviors needed for its own survival, realization and reproduction. In other words, it must know and classify its world adaptively, this in spite of the fact that the way it knows the world is not necessarily concordant with what that world veridically is, outside the terms of its own viewpoint. [Edelman 1987:26] What becomes clear here is that while the organism in knowing and classifying the world in these adaptively advantageous terms, does so, as proposed by the biologist Richard Dawkins, for the long term good and stable reproduction of the genes which comprise its genome, genes of whose reproductive imperative the organism is merely a vehicle [Dawkins, cited by Eldridge, 1995:180], that long-term goal can, nevertheless, only be secured through the mediation of what the "vehicle" i.e. the individual organism, feels to be to its own advantage as a mode of being in the world. Through the mediation, therefore, of what it subjectively experiences as "good" or "bad" for itself, as it interacts with its environment, displaying the behaviors that are of adaptive advantage to its realization, survival and reproduction.

If, therefore, we postulate by analogy, that the "socialized" normal subject of each order, must, like the organism, also know and classify the world in terms that are of adaptive advantage to its "artificial" or culturally constructed "sense of self", rather than in terms of the veridical truth of what that world empirically is, outside its own viewpoint, the same corollary follows. This is that while its mode of viewpoint- knowing is adaptively advantageous, in the long term, to the stable reproduction of the sociogenic principle instituting of its culture-specific mode of being human, it can continue to be so, only through the mediation of what the individual human subject feels to be to its own adaptive advantage (i.e. to be "good" and bad for itself), as it interacts with both its physical and its sociohuman environments or "worlds". That is, through the mediation of what the individual is
educated black is socialized to experience his / our own physiognomic being, as well as his / our African cultures of origin, as “bad”; as archetypally Evil, as in Aimé Césaire terms, "le part maudite" from which one must separate oneself, if one is to be fully human,24 to “feel good” in the terms of our present ethno-class conception of the human.

Here, Franklin's question "why are there subjective states?", can be answered by the posing of another question. How, exactly, at the level of organic life, does each organism come to experience objects in the world in the specific terms of its nervous system's order of perception and categorization, as being to its adaptive advantage (good) or not to its adaptive advantage (bad)? Further, at the level of human forms of life, how exactly is a “normal subject” made to experience objects in the world, in the terms of its specific culture's system of perception and categorization as being to its own adaptive advantage (good), or not to its own adaptive advantage (bad)? Here the findings of biochemists made in the wake of the remarkable discoveries, during the seventies and eighties, of the existence of indigenous morphine-like molecules or opioid peptides in the brain, the nervous system and indeed throughout the body of all species, suggests an answer. And this answer not only explains why, as Chalmers proposed, subjective experience should be seen as a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic. It also, at the same time, answers Nagel's question with respect to how "objective processes can give rise to subjective states", as well as validates Fanon's identification of the socio-cultural objective processes that leads to the "aberrations of affect", off both White, non-white / non-black, anti-Black racism and Black autophobia: with these aberrations therefore common to all subjects culturally Westernized in the ethno-class terms of "Man ".

In his book, Addiction: From Biology to Drug Policy, the neurobiologist Avram Goldstein, in the course off his discussion of the neurochemistry of pleasure and pain, put forward the hypothesis that in all living species " a natural opioid system exists for signaling both reward (probably by beta-endorphin) and punishment (by dynorphins)". Further that "the balance of these opposing opioid peptides may regulate many aspects" of what is experienced is a "normal state of mind. " He then speculates that it is these reward systems, "that drive adaptive behaviors". For these systems "signal 'good' when food is found and eaten by a hungry animal, when water is found and drunk by a thirsty animal, when sexual activity is promised and consummated, when a threatening situation is averted." When "harmful behavior is engaged in or when pain is experienced", on the other hand, "they signal bad". So that as "these signals become associated with the situations in which they are generated, and they are remembered", their functioning "seems to represent the necessary process by which an animal learns to seek what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful..." [Goldstein, 1994:60]

What Goldstein, therefore, suggests here, is that the phenomenology off subjective experience (i.e. what feels good and what feels bad to each organism) is neurochemically determined in species-specific behavior motivating terms. It is therefore this objectively structured biochemical system that determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify and categorize the world in the adaptive terms needed for its own survival and reproductive realization as such an organism. Yet, at the same time, as it is only through the mediation of the organism's experience off what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby off what it feels like to be that organism as the only entity for which these specific feelings exist, that the specific repertoire off behaviors that are off adaptive advantage both for that organism, and as well, for the reproductive transmission off the genetic information that its species-specific genomic principle encodes, will be stably motivated and displayed. This at the same time as those that are disadvantageous for both the organism and its genome, will be demotivated, because made to be subjectively experienced as "bad" by the organism. So that, if the genes that comprise each species-specific genome, are to be reproduced by means of behaviors adaptively suited to deal with the specific challenges of the environment in which the vehicle-organism, (to use Dawkin's formulation) 25 finds itself, such behaviors can be ensured only through
ecosystem; only through the experience, therefore, of what it is like to *be* that organism. The why of subjective experience, therefore, as found in the fact that the way Nagel’s bat, for example, classifies the world in terms of what *feels good* and what *feels bad* for it, is as objectively determinant of the stable reproduction of that organism’s mode of species being, or genomic principle, as is its physiological architecture by means of whose species-specific natural opioid system, such a mode of subjective experiencing, by the individual organism, is at the same time, made possible.

But what of ourselves as human subjects? Specifically as subjects of our contemporary order, for whom, as Fanon points out, it is “normal” to be anti-Negro, within the case of Negroes socialized in the terms of “Man”, a central contradiction being set up between the natural opioid system, (in whose genetically determined terms our physiognomic being should be experienced as “good”), and the reality of a cultural mode of identity and therefore of sociogeny, in whose terms this physiognomic being must be experienced as “bad”. Goldstein is of no help in this respect. Given that because his hypothesis, as it relates to humans, is put forward on the basis of the purely ontogenetic, and thereby biocentric, conception of the human which functions as the non-questioned premise of our present epistemological order, his conclusion logically presupposes that these opioid reward and punishment behavior-motivational systems, function in exactly the same way for us as they do for all forms of purely organic life. He puts forward this conclusion in the course of his argument against the legalization of addictive drugs. The widespread contemporary use of addictive drugs, he argues, can only be understood in an evolutionary context, given that when seen in this perspective, the “feel good” quality of these drugs can be recognized as being due to the fact that they are “not even foreign to the body”, since what they do is to “merely mimic or block the eurotransmitters that function normally to signal reward.” What is thereby being disturbed by widespread drug addiction, is “the delicately regulated system” that “was perfected by evolution over millions of years to serve the survival of all species”, as a system whose undisturbed natural functioning allows us humans, to “experience pleasure and satisfaction from the biologically appropriate behaviors and situations of daily life.” [Goldstein:1994:60]

But do we, as humans, experience pleasure and satisfaction only from *biologically* appropriate behaviors? Does the opioid system in our case function only *naturally*? If, as Goldstein would propose, the answer to both of these is a yes, then how account for the fact, that, as the description of the early seventeenth century Congolese reveal, what was subjectively experienced as being aesthetically “correct” and appropriate, by the Congolese, (i.e. their qualitative mental states of dynorphin-activated aversion on the one hand, and their beta-endorphin activated "pleasure and satisfaction" states on the other), was entirely the reverse of what is subjectively experienced by Western and westernized subjects as being aesthetically correct and appropriate? How can the same objects, i.e. the white skin color and Caucasoid physiognomy of the Indo-European human hereditary variation, and the black skin color and Negroid physiognomy of the African/Congolese human hereditary variation, give rise, in purely biological terms, to subjective experiences that are the direct opposite of each other? While if, as Stan Franklin points out, *qualia* is the terms used for the qualitative aspects of our mental states such as color sensations, the taste of chocolate, pleasure and pain, [Franklin, 1995: 32] and, therefore, such as the aversive sensations of horror, why did the then still culturally autocentric Congolese experience their own black skin color and the white skin color of the Europeans in binarily opposed terms to the way in which, these skin colors are subjectively experienced by the Europeans who shout "Dirty Nigger”? By Blacks Who experience their /our own physiognomic and skin-color aversively? Could the aversive sensation of horror (i.e. the specific qualitative mental states) experienced by the Congolese at the sight of the white skin and Caucasoid physiognomy be attributed only to a genetic-instinctual revulsion to a people whose physiognomic appearance differs So markedly from their own? And vice versa? If this is so, how explain the central symbolic role of sacred and liminally deviant monstrosity mapped onto the white-skinned albino...
Teruel also tells us, "are regarded by the Congolese as monsters" --the equally white-skinned Europeans were assimilated? Are we not here confronted with the fact that it is because, as ethnographic studies now make clear, the figure of the albino, played a parallel archetypal role in the cultural constellation of the traditional Congolese, if in Agrarian polytheistic religious terms, to the one that, as Fanon notes [Epigraph 2], is played, in our now purely secular "cultural constellation" by the figure of the "Negro"? As the analogue, that is, of the "boundary marker" of normal being, and as such, in our biocentric conception, as the "expression of the bad instincts", of the "uncivilized savage" who threatens to overwhelm the "normal", "white" and middle class subjects of our contemporary order?

Are we not in both cases dealing here with the processes of functioning of two differently culturally programmed opioid systems, two different senses of the self of which they are a function? How else explain, in the case of the sensory qualia correlated with the shouted cry "Dirty Nigger!", that the same aversive response is subjectively experienced not only by all peoples who have been culturally Westernized, but also by, as Fanon explores, black peoples who have been Westernized ourselves? By, indeed, the descendants also of the once "normal" Congolese subjects, now classified, in the terms of the culture imposed upon them, as "Negroes", and, as such, as abnormal? Does this not make it clear that the proposal that both modes of subjectively experiencing "black" and "white", are merely the expression of two different genetic-instinctual narcissistic somatic norms, one White, one Black, will not hold up? Seeing that were it a purely somatic issue, we should then be compelled to inquire as to what has happened to the somatic narcissism, not only of blacks who wear white masks (i.e. desire a white appearance), but also to that of the millions of non-Europeans, who now increasingly make use of plastic surgery to secure for themselves a physiognomic appearance nearer to that of the Indo-European, in its bourgeois configuration. Why should there be such widespread anxiety for Semitic noses to be clipped and shortened, Mexican-Indian noses to be heightened, the folds of Asian eyelids removed, the shape of the eyes rounded? Why, even more ominously in the brave new world of our bio-tech century, is the term “genetic enhancement” (a euphemism for eugenics), used to refer to the bio-genetic engineering processes designed to ensure the birth of babies with blue eyes, European type noses and European type eyes; to ensure only the "production" of those physiognomies sculpted in the terms of the hegemonic aesthetic of the Western-bourgeois conception and criterion of being human? 27

The comparison of, in Nagel's terms, two differing viewpoints, and psychoaffective responses, on the basis of the perspective of a “common reality” outside the terms of both, here enables us to propose, after Fanon, that it is the culturally constructed sociogenic principle that, in both cases, by mapping or totemizing negative/positive meanings (as part of a cultural series) on the non-humanly instituted difference (as a natural series) 28, that activates, by their semantic reprogramming, the opioid system in culture-specific terms? Thereby enabling the radically opposed qualitative subjective responses to what is, in effect, the same objects? With Fanon's hypothesis that in the case of our own culture, Black skins wear white masks, being but a special case of the fact that all humans wear cultural masks ("besides phylogeny and ontogeny there stands sociogeny"), with the result that, although born as biological humans (as human skins), we can experience ourselves as human, only through the mediation of the processes of socialization effected by the invented tekhne or cultural technology to which we give the name culture? If this is so then the recognition that, as Terence Deacon points out, [Epigraph 2] we are, as humans, what we experience ourselves to be (in effect, what we are culturally-verbally socialized to experience ourselves to be), not only provides the answer to Franklin's question, but at the same time, enables Chalmers' puzzle of conscious experience to cease being one. Seeing that because all modes of human conscious experience, and thereby, of consciousness, can now be seen to be, in all cases, the expression of the culturally constructed mode of subjective experience specific to the functioning of each culture's sociogenic "sense
organic life. In both cases, therefore, specific information states can be seen as being inseparable from each form of life's (whether purely organic or hybridly human), subjective experiencing of what it is like to be like/to be, each such mode of being; and, to thereby behave appropriately (biologically or culturally) in the modalities necessary to the realization, survival and reproduction of each such mode of being.

In this context, we can invert the analogical process, in order to propose that if it is the information-encoding genomic organizational principle of the bat, (including centrally the neurochemistry of its species-specific opioid reward and punishment), that serves to induce its appropriate behaviors, through the mediation of each bat's subjective experience of what feels good and what feels bad to and for it, it is, in the case of the human species, the sociogenic principle, as the information-encoding organizational principle of each culture's criterion of being/non-being, that functions to artificially activate the neurochemistry of the reward and punishment pathway; doing so in the terms needed to institute the human subjects as a culture-specific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being and "sense of self". One, therefore, whose phenomenology (i.e. the parameters of its qualitative mental states, order of consciousness and mode of subjective experience) is as objectively, constructed as its physiology, like that of the bat's, is objectively, because biologically, structured.

The Natural-Scientific Language of Neurobiology? Or the Hybrid Nature-Culture Language of Fanon’s Sociodiagnostics, Césaire’s Science of the Word? To Reinvent Nagel’s "Objective Phenomenology"

"I grasp my narcissism with both hands and I turn my back on the degradation of those who would make man a mere mechanism." [BS: 23]

"Contrary to common opinion, the prime metaphysical significance of artificial intelligence is that it can counteract the subtly dehumanizing influence of natural science, of which so many cultural critics have complained. It does this by showing, in a scientifically acceptable manner, how it is possible for psychological beings to be grounded in a material world and yet be properly distinguished from 'mere matter'. Far from showing that human beings are 'nothing but machines', it confirms our insistence that we are essentially subjective creatures living through our own mental constructions of reality." [Margaret Boden, 1977:473]

The above hypothesis takes us back both to Fanon's proposal for a sociodiagnostics as the only possible "cure" for the aberration of affect induced in the black by the massive "psychoexistential complex" in which he/she finds him/herself entrapped, as well as to the challenge of Nagel to which it is related. This is the challenge with respect to the possibility of elaborating an objective phenomenology, on the basis of a methodology analogous to that of the natural sciences, yet different from it. As such, one that would be able to take its departure from the "particularity of the point of view" of the subjectively experiencing subject, yet be able to postulate a "common reality" outside the terms of that point of view. Here it seems to me, that both Nagel's call for an objective phenomenology, as well as Chalmers' call for the identification of fundamental laws specific to consciousness, when linked to Fanon's hypothesis, with respect to the hybrid nature of human identity, enables the positing, in the case of the human species, of laws beyond those of natural laws. Ones that, nevertheless, function in tandem with the latter, so as to bring into being the hybrid nature-culture modes of being or forms of life specific to being human. With this result that, if as Jonathan Miller pointed out in a 1992 essay, while consciousness "is implemented by eurobiological processes", "the language of neurobiology" still remains unable to convey what it's like to be conscious, then the proposal here is that the finding of a new "language" able to do this, could be made possible only on the basis of the new postulate; that of the existence of autonomously functioning laws of culture, as laws which "in their accustomed
Doing this in the same way, as the "language of neurobiology", was itself made possible only in the wake of the intellectual revolution of Renaissance of humanism, and of its then new poetics, in whose terms alone, as Ferdinando Hallyn has identified in his study on Copernicus and Kepler, the postulate of the non-arbitrarily and autonomously functioning, (rather than divinely and arbitrarily regulated) laws of nature, (i.e. *cursus solitus naturae*), indispensable to the emergence of the natural sciences, was to be conceptualizable. At the same time as it was to be the new postulate, in the reoccupied place of the millennial belief in Divine Supernatural Causation, of autonomously functioning laws of nature as the "cause" of the functioning of physical processes, and in the wake of Darwin, of biological processes, that was to emancipate the levels of physical and purely organic reality from having to continue to be known adaptively, rather than veridically, thereby enabling the emergence of a new natural scientific mode of human cognition.

Parallely, a new language able to convey what *its like* to be conscious, outside the terms of each culture-specific order of consciousness, would also have to be one only findable within the term of the postulate of autonomously functioning laws of culture, as laws specific to the third (beyond the physical and the purely biological) and hybrid level of ontogenetic/sociogenetic existence—as the level that would be the specific domain of inquiry of this new language. Given that if the parameters of what it is like to be human, to be *us*, in other words, the parameters of our orders of consciousness and modes of subjective experience, are instituted in lawlikely consistent ways specific to each culture’s "sense of self" or sociogenic principle, (with the aversive mental states and shout of "Dirty Nigger!" by "normal" white subjects, and of those of autophobia by "normal" black subjects, being as lawlikely determined by our present "sense of self" and its conception of what it is like to be human, as those of the Congolese, to the white skin color and physignomy of the Europeans, had been determined by that of the Congolese culture’s "sense of self" or sociogenic principle), it is only such a new "language", that would provide the answer in both to Nagel’s call for an objective phenomenology, as well as in response to Fanon’s call for a sociodiagnostics.

For if the processes of motivation that are determinant of the behaviors, not only of human subjects, but also of the species-specific behaviors of purely organic life, *can only function through the mediation of subjective mental states*, with such states thereby being the indispensable condition of each organism or each human subject’s realization as such an organism, or subject, at the same time as they are the condition of the replication of, on the one hand, the sociogenic principle and, on the other, the genomic principle, of which each the organism and the human subject is the lived expression, then the paradox we inescapably confront is: how, in the case of humans is the *particularity* of the viewpoint of each such mode of conscious experience, and therefore of each such culture-specific mode of the subject to be *recognized* by each such subject, *outside* the terms of the sociogenic principle which institutes him/her as such subject or specific mode of being? Outside, therefore, the terms of the order of consciousness which institutes it as such a subject? Here a point made by Jonathan Miller in his essay, reveals the dimensions of this paradox. In the course of his argument against the possibility of the "language of neurobiology" and its purely physicalistic assumption ever being able to come to grips with the phenomenon of consciousness, Miller pointed out that although the neuroscientists have illuminated the ways in which consciousness is neurophysiologically implemented by the brain, while consciousness is self-evident to anyone who has it, it, nevertheless, cannot be found or identified as a *property of the brain*; [Miller, 1992:182] and thereby a property identifiable, in Nagel’s terms, as that of a "common reality" .

The key issue to be noted here is that of what Miller rightly identifies as the *self-evidence* of consciousness to those who have it. Yet it is precisely this self-evident consciousness that Fanon has found himself not only compelled to call in question, but also to indict, as itself being the cause of the black’s autophobic as well as the white’s anti-black “aberration of affect”. So that if as Miller further argues, the language of neurobiology cannot “convey what its like to be conscious”
for and to whom such a specific, and necessarily adaptive, order of consciousness can be experienced as being self-evident. Seeing that such self-evidence can be recognized as itself being a property of the terms in which each subject has been socialized into a specific mode of being human; terms that then prescribes the adaptively advantageous parameters in which each such subject must necessarily know, as well as psycho-affectively respond to, Self, Other, and World, as the condition of the adaptively advantageous reproduction of each such mode of being human. With the logical consequence being, that in the case of our contemporary order of consciousness, the modes of subjective experience expressed on the one hand, by anti-black and anti-non-white racism, and on the other, by black autophobia, are, like all the other correlated isms, the lawlike expressions of a, to its subjects, self-evident order of consciousness. Yet as an order of consciousness that is, at the same time, indispensable to the dynamic instituting and stable reproduction of our present ethno-class conception/ criterion of the human, as well as to that of the/our contemporary global order as the specific socio-global field in which it is alone realizable as such a mode of being and genre of human identity. So that if this is indeed so, if the black/white psycho-existential complex, as well as the respective "aberrations of affect"—i.e. that of anti-black racism, as well as that of black autophobia, are not only of "normal" adaptive advantage to our present mode of being human, to its governing sociogenic principle, how do we extricate ourselves? How, as centrally, was it possible for Fanon himself to set afoot the possibility of our emancipation by means of his redefined conception of what it is to be human?

In his 1973 study of Borana peoples of Ethiopia and their traditional cultural order, the anthropologist Asmarom Legesse provided us with a transcultural perspective with respect to the "self-evidence" of consciousness. On the basis of data from his research, Legesse proposed that the intellectuals of the Borana order, like those of all human orders, including our contemporary own, must necessarily function as the guardians, elaborators and disseminators of the instituting prescriptive categories on which their societies are founded. As the condition of the dynamic realization and stable reproduction of their specific social orders, therefore, Borana intellectuals, like all such intellectuals, including ourselves, remain normally imprisoned in the very structural models that they/we elaborate; that is, in the adaptive "native model" of reality that we ourselves construct, as the condition of the production and reproduction of our culture-specific modes of being human, as well as of the specific social orders that is the condition of their enacted expression. As a result, he further argues, it is only from the ground of the lived experience of the liminally deviant category of each order, (through the mediation of whose negated mode of "abnormal" difference the "normal" society is enabled to experience itself both as "normal", and as, a socially cohesive community), [Legesse, 1973:114-115] that the normative order of consciousness generated on the basis of their own ontological negation, can come to be critically questioned, its self-evidence called in question. [Legesse, 1973:269-271] In effect, while there can be, for the mainstream intellectuals as the grammarians of their/our respective orders, no "outside" to the "native model" on whose basis what makes the "normal" normal, the real real30 and the self-evident, self-evident, for their societies and their societies' mode of being human, it is the liminal category, who from the experience of its necessarily conflicted order of consciousness and inside/outside relation to the "native models" point of view, that, in seeking to emancipate itself from its systemically imposed role, can alone "remind us that we need not forever remain prisoners of our prescriptions" [Legesse, 1973: 271]. Prisoners, that is, of the self-evidence of the order of consciousness, that is everywhere the property of each culture's sociogenic principle, and of the mode of nature-culture symbiosis to which each such principle gives rise.

Fanon's exploration of the ground of the lived experience of the black, can therefore be recognized here as one carried out from the liminal perspective of what it is like to be both "Man" (as an educated middle class and westernized subject) and its Nigger Other: to be both the embodiment of the Western.
and its anti-criterion, and as such as the negatively marked symbolic death of its "bad" genetic-instinctual self. It is from this conflicted perspective, that he is therefore able to alert us to the possibility of our attaining to the full dimensions of our human autonomy, one inseparable from the possibility not merely of, in Nagel's still acultural terms, an objective phenomenology but, more comprehensively, of, in Vico's terms, a new science, specific to the human, or in the terms put forward by Fanon's fellow Martinican poet thinker Aimé Césaire, in 1946, that of a new science of the Word. Seeing that if we compare Fanon's thesis, (made on the basis of his analysis of both the educational material and everyday literature in whose terms both the French Caribbean middle class black and the French middle class themselves are educated and socialized), that it was and is normal for the first to be as anti-Negro as the second, with the no less culturally normal reflex aversive reaction of horror experienced by the normal traditional Congolese subject of the sight of what was, to them, the albino-type deviant monstrosity of the white skin of the European, this comparison enables us to identify the Fanonian concept of sociogeny as that of a transcultural constant able to constitute of a "common reality" that is separate from the particularistic points of view, of both cultures. One that, in the same way, as the natural scientific description of the human experience of sound as a "wave phenomenon" provides an extra-human viewpoint description, which does not, in any way, negate the reality of the human's subjective experiencing of the phenomenon as sound, is also able to provide the possibility of an objective description of these two opposed yet also parallel qualitative mental states, or modes of subjective experience; as a description which does not call for their respective culture-specific subjective experience of what it is like to be human, and therefore of what it is like to be self-evidently conscious, in the terms of each of their culture's adaptive order of consciousness-the phenomenon identified by Marx as that of ideology or "false consciousness"--to be reduced. Unlike the "common reality" of a wave phenomenon, however, the sociogenic principle is not a natural scientific object of knowledge. In that if, in the case of humans, this transcultural constant is that of the sociogenic principle as a culturally programmed rather than genetically articulated "sense of self", with the "property" of the mind or human consciousness being located only in the dynamic processes of symbiotic interaction between the opioid reward and punishment system of the brain and the culture-specific governing code or sociogenic principle (as the semantic activating agent) specific to each of our hybrid nature-culture modes of being, and thereby, of experiencing ourselves as human, then the identification of the hybrid property of consciousness, which such a principle makes possible, would call for another form of scientific knowledge beyond the limits of the natural sciences- including beyond that of neurobiology whose natural-scientific approach to the phenomenon of consciousness is paradoxically based on our present culture's purely biocentric and adaptive conception of what it is to be human.

If, in the above context, it is this purely biocentric conception of the human, one that reduces him/her to the purely organic status of an animal, against which, Fanon, 'grasping his narcissism in both hands/', posited his counter-manifesto of what it is to be huma, i.e. "besides ontogeny there stands sociogeny", then his call for a sociodiagnostic, itself suggests the need for a new scientific order of knowledge, able to confront and deal with the hybridity of our modes of being human. Specifically, able to deal with the fact that, as Nagel pointed out, the methodology called for, in the case of an objective phenomenology I would no longer be the natural-scientific methodology based on the setting aside of the way things subjectively appear to us. But instead on one that would take both the way things appear regularly, and consistently to us as normal subjects of our order, and are therefore self-evidently evident to our consciousness, and as well, as in the case of Fanon's French Caribbean Negro who is anti-Negro, our reflex qualitative mental states and/ or sensory qualia, as the objects of our inquiry .Since it is these subjective experiences that alone would provide us with objective data with respect to the processes of functioning of the culture-specific governing code or sociogenic principle in whose terms we have been socialized as subjects, and which is
Such a new science would therefore have to be (as already suggested by Fanon's exploration of the lived experience of the black) one able to harness the findings of the natural sciences, (including the neurosciences), to its purposes, yet able to transcend them in the terms of a new synthesis able to make our uniquely hybrid nature / culture modes of being human, of human identity subject to "scientific description in a new way". It is such a new science that Fanon's fellow Martinican, the Negritude poet and essayist, and political activist, Aimé Césaire, coming from the same lived experience of being both "Man" and its liminal Other, had called for in 1946. In a conference paper, delivered that year entitled Poetry and Knowledge, Césaire, after pointing out that the natural sciences for all their triumphs with respect to the kind of knowledge able to make the natural worlds predictable, had nevertheless, remained "half starved", because of their inability to make our human worlds intelligible, had then proposed that in the same way as the "new Cartesian algebra had permitted the construction of theoretical physics" so too "the word promises to be an algebraic equation that makes the world intelligible", one able to provide us with the basis of a new "theoretical and heedless science that poetry could already give an approximate notion of." A science, therefore, in which the "study of words", would come to condition "the study of nature". It is such a new science that Fanon's call for a sociodiagnostic, Nagel's for an objective phenomenology, Chalmers' for the identification of the fundamental psychophysical laws specific to conscious experience, will be made possible; that we shall be able to, in Fanon's terms, "set man free". Given that within the viewpoint specific to our present culture's biocentric, conception of the human, not only must the phenomenon of mind and conscious experience, remain a puzzle, but the processes by means of which we objectively construct ourselves as, as Margaret Boden points out, "subjective creatures living through our own mental constructions of reality," must as necessarily continue to remain opaque to us. With the result that we are left unable to move beyond the limits both of our present adaptive order of objective knowledge, as well as of the no less adaptive psychoexistential complex of qualitative mental states (in which the Dirty Nigger! cum autophobic aversive response is only one, if the most extreme, of a series of interchangeable such responses to a series of also reified Others), to which our present culture's biologically absolute notion of human identity, as expressed in the "normal" Self of "Man", lawlikely gives rise.

"I should remind myself", Fanon wrote, in the conclusion of his Black Skin/White Masks, "that the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence." ...I am a part of Being to the extent that I go beyond it." [BS:229]

Notes


2. The original French version Peau Noire, Masques Blancs was published in 1952, with a Preface by Francis Jeanson, by Editions Du Seuil, Paris. It was republished in 1965 with the earlier Preface as well as with a new Afterword by Jeanson. The English translation by Markmann (which I have used in the essay)
3. These include Ronald Judy who writes, "The title that Fanon gave to the fifth chapter of *Peau noire, masques blancs* was "*L'expérience vécue du Noir"* which Charles Lam Markmann translated as "The Fact of blackness" . . . .What is cut away completely is the focal concern with experience. *L'expérience vécue* is conflated into "the fact" so that the adjective becomes the substantive. Although vécue can be rendered in English, as something like "factual" it is the very nature of the referenced factuality that is vexing. Is the factual that which is in-itself independent of consciousness or is it that which is in-itself-for consciousness? With vécue, we are thus brought to ponder experience." See his "Fanon's Body of Black Experience" (p. 53) in Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White eds. *Fanon: A Critical Reader*. Oxford, UK, Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996: pp. 53-73.

4. Godzich’s point, with respect to the question of the societal context of our modes of human identity, is illuminating. In his Afterword to Samuel Weber's *Institution and Interpretation* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987), he noted that "for a society to know itself" it "must know where its legitimacy lies," that "furthermore it must have a sense that its order is neither anarchic nor nonsensical but must be ...the realization of true order." Even though "its intelligibility" may be a challenge to our limited cognitive means, "it must possess it in principle." As he continues: "If all these conditions obtain ...order and change are both possible and the society is assured of continuity. But for that to occur, the foundational principles cannot be found in the society at large but must be located in a space of otherness that ensures that they remain beyond the reach of human desire and temptation. This space of otherness is either absolute or mediated through the institutions of the state. In other words the society carries a heavy burden of debt to this space of otherness; it owes its meaning, its organization, its capacity to act upon itself, and thus its ability to manage order and change. This is the foundational debt of meaning that pervades all institutions, including the academic disciplines." (p. 161)

5. As Hans Blumenberg points out, while Darwin justified "nature's indifference to what is alive at any give time, over thousands of generations, by appeal to the 'unerring power of natural selection' and derived from this natural right the demand... that society should open for all men the free competition that grants to the most successful the greatest number of descendants", it is the very attempt to extract a specific "social relevance" (in my terms a culture and class specific one), from the new conception of evolution "that makes the heterochrony" that is "the lack of temporal congruity between the natural process and the acute historical situation (in my terms, the culture-historical situation), in which man finds himself, emerge with extreme sharpness." In other words, because the temporality of Evolution is totally non-convergent with the modes of temporality specific to human forms of life, the process of Evolution comes to take the "space of otherness" place for the now purely secular and bourgeois conception of the human, *Man*, that had been taken by the realm of the supernatural for all other human options or modes of being human. As in the case of the "space of otherness" of the supernatural, that of Evolution also enables the evasion, by humans, of the culturally relative and auto-instituted nature of our modes of being human; of the reality of Fanon's sociogeny / sociogenic principle. As Blumenberg continues:

"With this man took shelter," as Dolf Sternberger has put it *under this bizarre gradualness, and he is warmer here... than in the position of free outcast who confronted the rest of nature, as a trial, task, issue, and enigma, as an alien abode... this last of all alliances with nature was a blind alley-for many reasons, among which some were, in their implications frightful. . . Malthus and Darwin had both made their theories culminate in the advice that man should obey the law of nature by clearing away the social hindrances to its unmediated and unadulterated operation." [*Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* Trans. Robert
6. Luc de Heusch made this point in his book *Sacrifice in Africa: A Structuralist Approach*. (Manchester, UK.: Manchester University Press, 1985). Defending the anthropologist’s Marcel Griaule's account of the origin myths and religion of the Dogon peoples of Africa as told him by the Dogon sage Ogottemmi, Luc de Heusch wrote, “Many of Griaule’s detractors have questioned the interest of the Dogon’s intellectual speculations, which seemed to them to be floating in a sociological void. As if lineage, family, existed independently of the system of representations which they arrived at in order to explain existence, as if ‘... social reality could be analytically disassociated from the symbolic. It is trivial to object that the thought of the Dogon 'doctors' is not the same as that of ignorant men. In 1948 Griaule already foresaw this argument and answered it forcefully: "One would not undertake to charge the Christian dogma of the transubstantiation with esotericism on the pretext that the man in the street does not know the word and has only glimmerings of the thing itself" (Griaule, 1948: 9). *Who would dare deny that Christianity, a religion of sacrifice, has, from its formation and throughout the centuries, established the ultimate reference point of our own social system, beyond the various modes of production which have marked its development?"* (p.159)


12. In his *The Order of Things* (1973), Foucault noted, that "man" is a "recent invention within ...European culture since the sixteenth century ." (p. 386) However, Jacob Pandian points out in his 1985 book *Anthropology and The Western Tradition: Towards an authentic anthropology* (Prospect Heights, IL.: Waveland Press, 1985), that the process by which Western Europe transformed his religious identity of the *True Christian Self* into that of *Man*, doing this in two forms, one in the sixteenth and the other in the nineteenth century, was to be effected only through its parallel invention of two conceptions of the *Human Other* in the place of the earlier religious *Other of the Untrue Christian Self* The physical referent of the first conception of *Human Othersness* defined as that of the *Savage Irrational Other*, to that of *Man* conceived of as political subject and as the *Rational Self*, was the *indio*/ Indian, i.e. the indigenous population group of the Americas and the Caribbean. While the African slave population group, i.e. the *negros/Negroes* was assimilated to the *indio*/ Indian category, because a group that was formally enslaved, while the latter were de jure if not de facto, free, it was represented as the most extreme form of irrationality, one that called for it to be enslaved, since so irrational as a population, that it had to be governed for its own good. When
(unmixed and mixed), that would now be made into the physical referent of the ostensibly most racially inferior and non-evolved Other to Man, itself redefined as optimally homo economicus. Indians, together with all other non-white colonized groups were now classified as natives and assimilated, if to varying lesser and greater degrees, to the category of Negroes/nigger/ Human Otherness. See for this both Jacob Pandian and also León Poliakov The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalistic Ideas in Europe Trans. Edmund Howard, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1974). The latter enables us to trace the "Human Otherness" construct that would come to be based on race, to its first religio-political form in the Iberian peninsula. "The religious unification of Spain from 1492 onwards," Poliakov points out in the case of the first, "had given rise to the problem of the conversos or converts, either Moriscos (Muslim converts) or Marranos (Jewish converts), who had been more or less adequately baptized in the fifteenth century. Spaniards of all ranks laid claim to their authentically Christian birth, proclaimed themselves Old Christians and imposed on the hapless New Christians a discriminatory legislation--the decrees of purity of blood-- which relegated the latter to the bottom of the social scale. The doctrine they elaborated was that the heterodoxy or infidelity of certain ancestors, even though they were themselves descended from Adam and Eve, had defiled the blood of their issue, who thus became vitiated by heredity. We shall come across this idea of degeneration again, supported by entirely different arguments, in the anthropology of the Enlightenment."

This little known branch of history constitutes a revealing "introduction to the study of racialism in Europe." (pp. 136-137)

Not only was the concept of "purity of blood" to be transformed into that of "racial purity" but as Poliakov also shows, it would be the peoples of African hereditary descent who were to take the place in purely secular terms of the marrano and morisco; and as such, were to become the category destined for the bottom of the human scale, within the terms of the purely secular invention of "Man" in its purely biologized modality.

Even as between Indians and Negroes, Poliakov also writes, "a form of discrimination became apparent which was already perceptible in the first book about the New World (De Orbe Novo by Pietro d'Anghiera, 1516) where 'white' Indians were contrasted with 'black' Ethiopians. It can also be seen in the first attempt at 'racial classification' (by François Bernier in 1684) when the Indians were assimilated to the white race. This discrimination still finds an echo in every European language since the contacts between Europe and the other continents gave rise, in the case of the Indians, to the term métis or mestizo, which is not in itself pejorative, while mulatto is derived from mule, and mulattos are therefore half-breeds who until the nineteenth century were commonly thought to be sterile, that is to say, impotent or emasculated." Not only did Black men become "the butt of merciless censure by the white man, from Noah's curse on Ham, ...to the classification of Linnaeus and the descriptions of several philosophers of the Enlightenment," but blackness, and with it "a great range of evil associations, was contrasted with whiteness, as was innocence with crime, vice with virtue, and bestiality with humanity." Further, during the eighteenth century at the same time as Voltaire was assimilating Negroes to apes, there was in contrast "the theory which, using the American Indians as its chief example, idealized the man who was uncorrupted by civilization, the legendary Noble Savage.

"This Indian," Poliakov continues, "whether he was the Carib of Bernardin de Saint Pierre or the Huron of Voltaire, became a positive pattern of the enigmatic 'natural man', of that non-European who was to serve henceforth as a mirror to Europe, which seemed only to recognize in the Black Man, the hidden and negative side of its character. An these views and judgements, which were debated in cosmopolitan salons during the eighteenth century, had their origin in the Iberian peninsula. It was there too that the great key-words--mestizo, mulatto, negro, Indian and caste--originated and from there that they spread abroad, in common probably with the word 'race' itself." (pp. 135-136)
his speech to the Pan-African Conference held in London in 1900, then, in one of the essays in his 1903 The Souls of Black Folk. In both cases Dubois captured the same profound connotations of a concept that Fanon was also to see as one structuring of the psycho-existential complex between Black and White, and by extrapolation, between all non-white peoples and Whites. Raymond Logan cites both usages in his book The Betrayal of the Negro (New York, Collier Books, 1954), the first in 1900.

"The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line, the question as to how far differences of race, which show themselves chiefly in the color of the skin and the texture of the hair, are going to be made, hereafter, the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilizations." (p. 341)

Then, in The Souls of Black Folk. (1903)

"The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, the relation of the darker to the lighter races of man in Asian and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea." (p. 342)

14. What this shows is that how we identify ourselves, in effect, how we subjectively experience ourselves as human, is everywhere discursively and institutionally constructed. The control of these by a dominant group is therefore indispensable to systems of dominance and subordination. See for this specifically, Fanon's chapters on The Negro and Language as well as his chapter on The Negro and Psychopathology.

15. Fanon reveals here the role played by both school and family, as agents reinforcing each of the Other, in socializing the colonial Caribbean subject of African descent to be anti-Negro, by introducing him/her to despise all things African. The subjective experience of black autophobia as of anti-black racism is therefore shown by Fanon, to be objectively constructed. See specifically the two chapters cited in the note above.

16. In his book, Passage of Darkness: The Ethnobiology of the Haitian Zombie, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), Wade Davis, in spite of the unfortunate implications of the first part of his title, nevertheless, de-stereotypes the process of zombification, both by showing its institutional role as a deterrent sanction system, as well as by revealing the properties of the toxin used by the members of the Bizango Secret Society to induce the “death-in-life” state of being a zombie.

17. What Fanon enables us to see here is that the threat of “negrification” also functions as a threat of non-being within the terms of our present cultural (and class) conception of human identity; within the terms, therefore, of its governing sociogenic principle. It is in this context that the desire for “lactification”, which he also explores, can be seen as a desire for being fully human within the terms of our present conception of being human. See for this BS.111, and 47.

18. The recent visceral reaction to, and furore over, the proposal in the U. S. by the Oakland School Board of California, that the rules governing the Afro-English Creole (which they unfortunately labeled as Ebonics) needed to be understood by the teachers of standard English whose largely inner city students spoke it as their everyday vernacular, should be understood in a parallel context. The suggestion, further, by the School Board that the African linguistic origin of many of the grammatical usages of Afro- or Black English be explained, met with the same negative response that is reflexly showed to all things African, not only by the white middle class, but also by several prominent members of the Black middle class intelligentsia. What might be defined as a pervasive Afrophobia can here be recognized as an attribute that is indispensable to the realization of "normal"
directed towards the signifier of non-being within the terms of its criterion of being fully human.

19. Fanon referred to these scholars as Pearce and Williamson. He gives the name of their Research Center as Peckham, but without further details. [BS:22]

20. It is within the terms of the conception of the human as a purely biological being that both peoples of African hereditary descent, (Negroes) as well as those of all non-whites and formerly colonized "native" peoples, (including, centrally, the "native" peoples of the Americas classified as Indians), must be seen as a Lack of the generic or normal human status of the Indo-European peoples; that, in addition, peoples of African hereditary descent must be seen as the missing link between primates and the truly human.

21. This classification had a meaning specific to the Judaeo-Christian cultural and cosmogonic identity field of the West. The report given by the Spanish Capuchin, Antonio de Teruel, (as cited in Epigraph, p. 33), enables us to recognize the cultural specificity of the European usage of the term. The Congolese, Antonio de Teruel recounts, told the Portuguese slave traders that they were not to call them negros, but blacks (prietos). Negroes for them were slaves. And within the terms of the traditional Congolese culture, the name negros referred only to a specific social category who were considered to be legitimately enslavable. This was the category of those who had fallen out of the protection of their lineage, and who, rather than continuing to belong to the normative status category of the order (i.e. to the status of being free-born men and women who were as such full members of their lineages), were instead lineageless men and women. For the monotheistic Judaeo-Christian Portuguese, however, all peoples of African hereditary descent, because classified as the descendants of the cursed figure of the Biblical Ham, were negros, i.e. were, all potentially enslavable, buyable and sellable. See in this respect also Georges Balandier, Daily Life in the kingdom of the Kongo from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, Trans. Helen Weaver, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968).

22. Paolo Valesio defines this strategy as the topos of iconicity. He demonstrates the functioning of this figure in his analysis of a fragment from Heraclitus in which a specific mode of life, related to the bow, is made synonymous with the process of life itself. This strategy should be linked to the formulation made by Whitehead and Russell with respect to the difference that exists between a class of classes (i.e., "machinery") and a mere member of the class (i.e., tractors, cranes, etc.). The topos of iconicity absolutizes a mode of life, a member of the class of classes, human life in general, thereby enabling, in Todorov's terms, the conflation of species with genus, genus with species. See Paolo Valesio, Nova Antiqua: Rhetorics as Contemporary Theory (Bloomington Indian, 1980); and Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, trans. C. Porter (Ithaca, New York,1982).

23. In his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche made the illuminating point that human life came into existence as the unique form of life that it is, only due to the "tremendous labor" that the species was to effect upon itself, through the mediation of the "morality of mores". As he further noted, "the labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labor finds in this its meaning, its great justification notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity , and idiocy involved in it: with the aid of morality of the mores and the social straightjacket, man was actually made calculable." See Walter Kaufmann, ed. and translator, Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: Modern Library, 1968, p. 495).

25. Although Dawkins argued in his book *The Selfish Gene* that organisms are the "survival machines of genes," he also proposes that the human and human consciousness, can be seen "as the culmination of an evolutionary trend towards the emancipation of survival machines as executive decision takers from their ultimate masters, the genes." He argues that this has been made possible by the "new soup of human culture in which *memes* as units of cultural transmission take over." See the extract on "The Evolution of Consciousness" from *The Selfish Gene* which is republished in Connie Barlow ed. *From Gaia to Selfish Genes: Selected Writings in the Life Sciences* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, pp. 216-222). My suggestion here, is that, once in place, the sociogenic principle is no less "selfish".


27. In his book *Towards The Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (Madison Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), George Mosse shows the inter-relationships between the new bourgeois aesthetics and modern racism, with the eighteenth century postulate of the Greek Ideal type coming to be represented from the Enlightenment as a biologically determined and "normal" ideal of beauty: and therefore with the Negroid and Jewish physiognomies coming to be stigmatized as its negation. pp. 2-3, 12-35.

28. In his classic essay, *Totemism*, Claude Levi-Strauss pointed out that the animal totems of traditional cultures, were not "good to eat" as earlier anthropologists had thought, but were rather "good to think" with. In that, in a case where each clan, for example. had as its totem say, an eagle, a bear, a seal, the *natural series* of species difference was then mapped onto the series of invented *socio cultural differences*. If we see this further as the way in which the latter as a humanly *invented* system of difference is absolutized by being mapped onto the differences of the natural series, then the belief system of *race*, can be seen as a form of totemism. Seeing that the constant of human hereditary variations (a natural series) is used to absolutize the differential social hierarchies and identities which are invented by our contemporary order. The White/Black opposition, for example, enables the status organizing principle of genetic difference represented as an evolutionarily determined mode of value-difference, to be mapped onto, and thereby, to legitimate, the invented social hierarchy of class.


30. This very important point with respect to the ways in which different cultures make "the normal normal" and the "real real", doing so in different terms, is made by Michael Taussig in his book *Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing*. 

31. Fanon makes the point clear when he shows how the mythic origin narrative central to French history in its bourgeois or class conceptualization--i.e. "our ancestors the Gauls", (as opposed to that of the nobility who claimed aristocratic descent from the Franks), was solemnly repeated by black students in Martinique as part of the standard curriculum in which they too were taught.

"The black schoolboy in the Antilles," he writes, "who in his lessons is forever talking about "our ancestors, the Gauls," identifies himself with the explorer, the bringer of civilization, the white man who carries truth to savages-an all-white truth. There is identification--that is, the young Negro subjectively adopts a white man's attitude. He invests the hero, who is white, with all his own aggression... Little by little, one can observe in the young Antillean the formation and crystallization of an attitude and a way of thinking and seeing that are essentially white. When in school he has to read stories of savages told by white men, he always thinks of the Senegalese Because the Antillean does not think of himself as
is a Negro. That he will learn once he goes to Europe; and when he hears Negroes mentioned he will recognize that the word includes himself as well as the Senegalese." (p. 147-48)

Then, in a footnote, referring to the "our ancestors, the Gauls" origin myth that had been transposed from France to her black colonized subjects, he writes:

"One always sees a smile when one reports this aspect of education in Martinique. The smile comes because the comicality of the thing is obvious, but no one pursues it to its later consequences. Yet these are the important aspects, because three or four such phrases are the basis on which the young Antillean works out his view of the world." (p. 147)

32. This is the central point made by Emesto Grassi in his book *Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition* (University Park and London: The Pennsylvanian State University Press, 1980). Here his concept of the verbal and culturally relative modes of human identity coincide with Fanon's hypothesis that 'in the case of the human besides phylogeny and ontogeny there stands sociogeny.' See especially Chapters, "Language as The Presupposition of Religion: A Problem of Rhetoric as Philosophy" , pp. 103-114.


34. Aimé Césaire brilliantly captured the interrelated nature of this series when he wrote in his poem, *Notebook of a Return to a Native Land.*

As there are hyena-men and panther-men,
so I shall be a Jew man
a Kaffir man
a Hindu-from-Calcutta man
a man-from- Harlem- who-hasn' t -got -the-vote.

Famine man, curse man, torture man, you may seize
him at any moment, beat him, kill him, --yes perfectly
well kill him--accounting to no one, having to offer
an excuse to no one

a Jew man
a pogrom man
a whelp
a beggar.


35. Our "imprisonment" in our present biocentric conception of identity, and therefore, in its adaptive modes of knowing and feeling, leads logically to the kind of "normal" behaviours, whose collective consequences can range, on the negative side, from the small humiliations of everyday life, to vast deprivations of hunger and poverty as well as to the large-scale genocide that has now become characteristic of the twentieth century. In his book already cited (see Note 27), George Mosse makes this clear with respect to the Holocaust whose major target was the Jews of Europe, (together with other groups also classified in biological terms as "life unworthy of life") It is apposite here to note that one of the central stigmas placed upon Jews by the Nazis was that of their being an "Afro-Asian mogrel breed". See also Henry Friedlander, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill, 1995), where he makes the central
by the biological sciences that had a reason in the nineteenth century in the wake of Darwin. This ideology was to be inseparable from the purely biological description of the human and the genetic, racial ideology to which it gave rise. Within the frame of this ideology, all population groups classified as genetically inferior (i.e., "as life unworthy of life"), whether the handicapped, the mentally ill, the aged, the homosexual, or the "racially inferior" (i.e., Gypsies and, most totally, the Jews), were slated for extermination.

References


Danielli, J. F. "Altruism and the Internal Reward System or the Opium of the People", Journal of Social and Biological Sciences III (1980), 87-94.


Goldstein, Avram. Addiction: From Biology to Public Policy. (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1994.)


Teruel, Antonio de. Narrative Description of... the Kingdom of the Congo. (1663-1664) [Ms. 3533: 3574]. (National Library, Madrid, Spain).


NB: This paper has been reformatted during the electronic scanning process. The pagination of the original manuscript has been changed.